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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article traces the origins of the oral deposition1 in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”) with an emphasis on the role 
of the officer in charge of the deposition.  In Parts II and III, I document 
the origins of the deposition, drawing on published sources.  In Parts IV 
and V, I draw upon unpublished sources regarding the 1930s Advisory 
Committee’s decision not to provide for a judicial officer who would 
have the authority to rule on the admissibility of evidence during the 
deposition.  That decision was an important, yet overlooked, element in 
the shaping of modern American civil procedure, including the 
displacement of civil trial by pretrial discovery. 
A striking attribute of the modern American deposition is that 
opposing counsel conduct the questioning in the absence of a judicial 
officer.2  The Advisory Committee that drafted the 1938 Federal Rules 
considered a proposal to provide deponents, both party and non-party 
witnesses, with the option of requesting a master to rule on the 
admissibility of evidence at the pretrial examination.  According to 
archival sources, members of the Advisory Committee concluded that the 
systemic disadvantages of that proposal outweighed the advantages.3 
I describe the historical origins of three salient features of the 
deposition: the near-absence of the rules of evidence; the presence of an 
“officer in charge”4 who has no power to rule on the admissibility of 
evidence; and the breadth of the permitted scope of inquiry.5  I discuss 
																																																																																																																												
 1 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30 (governing the taking of oral depositions).  Although oral 
examination for discovery exists in non-American jurisdictions, including Canada, “[t]he 
oral deposition is an American innovation that remains uniquely characteristic of 
American civil procedure.”  JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER, BRUCE P. 
SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS 395 (2009). 
 2 See David J. Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural 
Systems: Germany and the United States, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 745, 752 (1986) (describing 
the international controversy that results when American lawyers take depositions in 
Germany). 
 3 See, infra, Part V.C. 
 4 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) (1938) (amended 1972) (“The officer before whom the 
deposition is to be taken . . . .”). 
 5 The expansive scope of pretrial discovery has displaced many trials by clarifying 
factual issues before trial.  See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in 
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why the term “officer” is misleading: the examination is conducted 
entirely by adverse parties in the absence of a judge or a judge-like 
figure.6  The officer in charge is simply a stenographer or notary public 
who swears in the deponent and records the testimony; he or she 
exercises no adjudicatory function.7 
The modern American deposition serves two primary functions.  
The deposition permits a party to preserve potential testimony for 
introduction at trial: a preservation of potential testimony function.  The 
deposition is also a tool for investigating potential evidence before trial: 
an investigation of potential evidence function.  Counsel orally questions 
an adverse witness, and the officer in charge of the deposition records the 
testimony verbatim.  Unless the deponent will be unavailable at trial, the 
purpose of this deposition is to provide discovery to the party and not to 
supply trial testimony.  At equity, “deposition” signified testimony taken 
by a court-appointed officer, based on party-propounded written 
interrogatories.8  “[T]his ex parte procedure was the primary vehicle for 
bringing witness testimony before the court.”9 
In Part II, I describe the discovery devices available in the federal 
courts just prior to the coming into force of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  In Part III, I discuss the role of the officer in charge of 
pretrial oral examinations in England and in the United States, and the 
																																																																																																																												
the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522 (2012).  Also, the high cost of discovery practice has 
promoted settlements.  See generally ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN 
TRIAL (2009); ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY (2001).  See also Stephen 
N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 301–
02 (2002) (noting the breadth of permitted discovery and the infrequency of trial in the 
American system).  The nearly unlimited right of discovery under the Federal Rules has 
also been blamed for impeding access to the legal system.  See Jack B. Weinstein, After 
Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being 
Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1906 (1989). 
 6 There does exist a role for the judge: overseeing pretrial conferences under Federal 
Rule 16; limiting the scope of the examination by granting protective orders pursuant to 
Rule 30(d); issuing sanctions under Rule 37; and generally settling discovery disputes 
between parties. 
 7 For the sake of consistency, I use the term “officer” to describe the person who 
swears in the examinant and records his testimony. 
 8 See WILLIAM HEATH BENNET, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE OF THE VARIOUS 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE MASTERS’ OFFICE IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY 12 (1834) (“[W]here 
the master decides . . . that witnesses are proper to be examined, the interrogatories for 
their examination are prepared and signed by counsel.”) (emphasis removed). 
 9 Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, 
and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1206 
(2005).  As a result of this historical distinction, I will employ “oral examination for 
discovery” to refer to a pretrial deposition that is for the purpose of discovery rather than 
for gathering proof. 
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origins of permitting parties to conduct the examination.  Part IV 
discusses the Advisory Committee that drafted the 1938 Rules and 
describes the expansion of discovery under those rules.  In Part V, I 
examine the Committee’s deliberations regarding the role of the officer 
in charge of the oral deposition, and in particular whether that person 
should have the power to rule on the admissibility of evidence.  In Part 
VI, I conclude by setting forth the origins of the oral deposition in the 
Federal Rules and suggesting that the creation of liberal discovery 
contributed to the decline of civil trial.  I include, at Appendix A, the 
draft rules (both published and unpublished) regarding the option, at a 
party’s request, of having a master with the power to rule on the 
admissibility of evidence appointed to be in charge of the deposition.  At 
Appendix B I sketch out the early origins of oral, as opposed to written, 
party-administered pretrial examination for discovery in Ontario – a 
jurisdiction that permitted such a procedure several years before New 
York’s Field Code authorized pretrial discovery of adversary parties. 
II. DISCOVERY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS JUST PRIOR TO THE FEDERAL 
RULES OF 1938 
A. Introduction 
Before 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the 
“Rules”) came into force, pretrial discovery was limited in cases at both 
law and equity in the federal courts.10  In actions at law, there was no 
right to pretrial oral examination of parties or witnesses for discovery 
purposes, even if the law of the state in which the court sat did permit 
such procedures.11  The Supreme Court had held that only federal, rather 
																																																																																																																												
 10 See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background 
of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 698–701 (1998) (describing 
pretrial discovery in the federal courts before the Rules were implemented). 
 11 6 JAMES WM. MOORE AT AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26 App. 100 (Daniel 
R. Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2011) (citing Ex Parte Fiske, 113 U.S. 713, 719–20 
(1885) (limiting the effect of both the Conformity Act and the Rules of Decision Act by 
holding that federal law prescribed the only procedure for obtaining evidence for trial at 
law in the federal courts)).  See also Gimenes v. New York & Porto Rico S. S. Co., 37 
F.2d 168, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (“It is regrettable that in the period between the 
commencement of an action on the law side of this court – or the removal of a law action 
from the state court to this court – and the trial of the case, this court is unable to do much 
to facilitate the preparation of either party for trial.”).  28 U.S.C. § 634 (1928) (amended 
1988) provided that “in causes pending at law and in equity in the district courts of the 
United States, it shall be lawful to take the depositions or testimony of witnesses in the 
manner prescribed by the laws of the State in which the courts are held,” but the Supreme 
Court held that this statute merely regulated the mode of taking depositions and did not 
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than state, statutes could authorize oral examination for discovery in 
actions at law, and that federal statutes did not permit oral examination 
for discovery.12 
Edson R. Sunderland, the University of Michigan Law School 
professor who drafted the Rules regarding discovery,13 stated in 1938 
that, prior to the Rules, there were “just four sources [of] authority for 
any proceeding involving discovery before trial in the federal courts”: 
two federal statutes and two equity rules.14  The discovery devices that 
the two statutes 15  authorized, however, served the preservation of 
potential testimony function and not the investigation of potential 
evidence function.  Of the two rules of equity,16  one was “the only 
provision in the entire federal system intended for discovery,” according 
to Sunderland.17 
																																																																																																																												
enlarge the grounds for taking so as to allow examinations before trial for purposes of 
discovery in accordance with state practice.  Hanks Dental Ass’n v. Int’l Tooth Crown 
Co., 194 U.S. 303, 308 (1904). 
 12 28 U.S.C. § 635 (1928) (amended 1990) (“[T]he mode of proof in the trial of 
actions at common law shall be by oral testimony and examination of witnesses in open 
court except as hereinafter provided.”); Hanks Dental Ass’n, 194 U.S. at 309 (citing 
National Cash Register Co. v. Leland, 94 F. 502 (1st Cir. 1899) (holding that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 635 prohibits both serving interrogatories upon an adverse party as well as oral 
examination of parties and witnesses in advance of the trial, except when permitted by 
federal statutes), cert. denied, 175 U.S. 724 (1899)).  Some federal courts sitting in states 
that permitted more liberal discovery than did the federal statutes nevertheless 
occasionally followed the state procedure in circumstances that were arguably not 
contemplated by the federal statutes.  See generally Anderson v. Mackay, 46 F. 105 
(S.D.N.Y. 1891) (permitting a party to obtain an order for the examination of an 
adversary to enable the party to frame pleadings when such an order was provided for by 
state statute); Donnelly v. Anderson Brown & Co., 275 F. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) 
(permitting, pursuant to state practice, an examination to frame a pleading because such 
an examination differed from the preservation of testimony for proof at trial and because 
the federal statute did not provide for that contingency, state practice should prevail); 
Heister v. Lehigh & N.E.R. Co., 50 F.2d 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (permitting an examination 
to aid in the framing of a bill of particulars on grounds similar to Donnelly). 
 13 Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 
MICH. L. REV. 6, 10 (1959) (“Thus with the Chairman’s approval I was able to 
commission Edson to prepare the draft of that part of the rules known originally as “V. 
DEPOSITIONS, DISCOVERY AND SUMMARY JUDGMENTS.”“). 
 14 Edson R. Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 19 (1938).  
Sunderland delivered this address to the West Virginia Bar Association on August 20, 
1938.  Id. at 5. 
 15 28 U.S.C. §§ 639(1928) (amended 1968), 644 (1928) (amended 1997). 
 16 FED. EQ. R. 47, 58. 
 17 Sunderland, supra note 14, at 20. 
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B. Federal Statutes Permitting Depositions to Preserve Testimony 
The two federal statutes authorized and governed the use of the 
deposition de bene esse 18  and the deposition pursuant to a dedimus 
potestatem. 19   The de bene esse provision permitted the taking of a 
deposition before trial when the witness might not be available to testify 
at trial.  The deposition de bene esse, which did not require an 
application to the court, could be taken only if the witness: 
1) was ancient or infirm, 2) lived more than 100 miles from the 
place of trial, 3) was bound on a voyage to sea, 4) was about to 
leave the United States, or 5) was out of the district where the 
case was to be tried and more than 100 miles from the place of 
trial, before the time of trial.20 
The dedimus potestatem provision supplemented the de bene esse statute, 
by permitting the taking of a deposition when such a deposition was 
necessary in order “to prevent a failure or delay of justice.”21   Any 
federal court could grant a dedimus to take a deposition, but the moving 
party had to make a showing: 
1) that the issue had been joined in a pending action, 2) that a 
dedimus was necessary to prevent a failure or delay of justice, 3) 
that the witness was beyond the reach of the court’s process, 4) 
that the testimony could not be taken de bene esse pursuant to 
notice, and 5) that the application was made in good faith and not 
merely for discovery purposes.22 
Both of these statutes applied to actions at law or at equity, but the 
depositions that these two statutes authorized were only available under 
limited circumstances.  Unlike the post-1938 deposition, which merged 
the preservation of potential testimony function and the investigation of 
																																																																																																																												
 18 28 U.S.C. § 639 (1928) (amended 1968). 
 19 28 U.S.C. § 644 (1928) (amended 1997).  A dedimus historically had been a “writ 
or commission out of chancery empowering one to do a specific act, such as 
administering an oath to a defendant and recording the defendant’s answers to questions.”  
Subrin, supra note 10, at 698. 
 20 6 MOORE, supra note 11 (citations omitted). 
 21 Sunderland, supra note 14, at 19. 
 22 6 MOORE, supra note 11 (citations omitted).  The requirement, under § 644, that 
the deposition must be held according to “common usage” constituted a further restriction 
on the usefulness of the statute for discovery purposes.  The Supreme Court held in 1885 
that a party seeking disclosure in advance of trial was restricted to the procedure 
prescribed by federal law for obtaining evidence for trial at law in the federal courts.  See 
supra, note 11. 
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potential evidence function, the de bene esse deposition served only the 
preservation of potential testimony function. 
C. Rules of Equity Permitting Depositions and Discovery 
1. Depositions at Equity 
Federal Equity Rules 47 and 58 governed discovery in cases at 
equity.  Federal Equity Rule 47, enacted in 1912, provided for taking the 
deposition of a witness.23  The 1912 Federal Equity Rules required oral 
testimony in open court,24 replacing the traditional equitable procedure of 
using documents and written testimony.25   Rule 47 thus permitted a 
departure from the general requirement of oral testimony, but the 
deposition that the Rule permitted was a means of gathering evidence for 
trial.26 
2. Three Equitable Discovery Devices 
i. Documentary Discovery 
Federal Equity Rule 58 codified the traditional bill of discovery 
available in equity.27  Under Rule 58, a party could move for a judicial 
																																																																																																																												
 23 GEORGE FREDERICK RUSH, THE ESSENTIALS OF EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE 
221 (1913) (citing FED. EQ. R. 47 (1912) (“The court, upon application of either party, 
when allowed by statute, or for good and exceptional cause for departing from the 
general rule, to be shown by affidavit, may permit the deposition of named witnesses.”)). 
 24 RUSH, supra note 23, at 220–21  (citing FED. R. EQ. 46 (“In all trials in equity the 
testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, except as otherwise provided 
by statute or these rules.”)).  Blackstone had approved of the common law’s requirement 
of oral testimony over equity’s written approach: “This open examination of witnesses 
viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of 
truth, than the private and secret examination taken down in writing before an officer, or 
his clerk . . . .”  3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373 
(University of Chicago Press 1979) (1765).  For subsequent commentary, see CHARLES 
BARTON, AN HISTORICAL TREATISE OF A SUIT IN EQUITY, IN WHICH IS ATTEMPTED A 
SCIENTIFIC DEDUCTION OF THE PROCEEDINGS USED ON THE EQUITY SIDES OF THE COURTS 
OF CHANCERY AND EXCHEQUER, FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SUIT TO THE DECREE 
AND APPEAL 156–58 n.1 (London, W. Clark & Son, 1796) (stating that oral testimony is 
superior because “the very manner of the witness giving evidence is not unfrequently 
[sic] a sufficient indication of the truth or falsity of his testimony, an advantage entirely 
lost in the Courts of Equity”). 
 25 For an assessment of the 1912 Federal Equity Rules, see Robert H. Talley, The 
New and Old Federal Equity Rules Compared, 18 VA. L. REV. 663 (1913). 
 26 “The purpose here [Federal Equity Rule 47] was not discovery but obtaining 
proof.”  Sunderland, supra note 14, at 20. 
 27 See discussion, infra Part II.D. 
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order that would allow the party “to effect the inspection or production of 
documents in the possession of either party and containing evidence 
material to the cause of action or defense of his adversary.”28  Consistent 
with the principle that discovery was meant to help a litigant prove his 
case, but not to explore his adversary’s evidence, 29  documentary 
discovery under Rule 58 was limited to discovering facts concerning the 
requesting party’s own case, but not the adversary’s case.30 
ii. Requests for Admission 
Federal Equity Rule 58 allowed a party to request from the 
adversary, before trial, a written admission of “the execution or 
genuineness of any document, letter or other writing.”31  This provision 
was of limited value.  Stephen Subrin has observed that “one would have 
to know in advance about the writing to seek the admission, and . . . there 
was only limited discovery as to this.”32 
iii. Written Interrogatories 
A written interrogatory was a party-propounded set of questions 
that was administered to the adversary before trial.  Rule 58 authorized a 
party to require a written interrogatory of an adversary for the discovery 
of “facts and documents material to the support or defense of the 
cause.”33 
The written interrogatory available under Rule 58 was, according to 
Sunderland, “very inadequate” as a method of discovery.34  As with the 
documentary discovery provision, a party could only use written 
interrogatories to determine facts related to the propounding party’s case, 
																																																																																																																												
 28 RUSH, supra note 23, at 225 (quoting FED. EQ. R. 58). 
 29 See Martin Conboy, Depositions, Discovery and Summary Judgments: As Dealt 
with in Title V of the Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal Courts, 22 
A.B.A. J. 881, 882 (1936) (noting “the traditional idea that in Chancery the right of a 
party to a discovery did not extend to all facts material to the issue, but was limited to 
such material facts as were necessary to establish his cause of action or defense”). 
 30 Sunderland thus noted that such discovery was “good for attack but not for 
defense.”  Sunderland, supra note 14, at 21.  Another restriction on the use of 
documentary discovery was that, under Rule 58, “the party seeking an inspection of 
documents was required to obtain an admission from the adverse party that the 
documents were in his possession, custody, or control before the court would make an 
order for their production.”  7 MOORE, supra note 11, § 34 App. 100. 
 31 RUSH, supra note 23, at 225. 
 32 Subrin, supra note 10, at 700. 
 33 RUSH, supra note 23, at 224. 
 34 Sunderland, supra note 14, at 20 (noting in addition that written interrogatories 
“are almost useless in many cases and are effective in none but the most simple matters”). 
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and only from an adverse party, not witnesses.  Written interrogatories 
were of limited value because the questioner could not adjust his 
questions to follow up on the answers he received.  Judge Learned Hand 
criticized the efficiency of written interrogatories in 1917: “A much more 
convenient way [to permit discovery] would be to . . . allow . . . an oral 
examination.”35 
There was an important difference between written interrogatory 
practice under the Equity Rules and oral deposition practice under the 
later Federal Rules: at equity, an examiner who was independent and 
neutral with respect to the parties administered the interrogatory and 
recorded the testimony;36 at the oral deposition, counsel for the party 
seeking discovery was authorized to ask the adversary questions.37 
D. Equitable Bill of Discovery at Common Law 
While the Federal Equity Rules applied to trials at equity but not at 
law, a litigant in federal court was permitted to bring a bill of discovery 
at equity to obtain discovery in an action at law.38  The federal courts 
were reluctant to grant these requests because such discovery was 
available only when an “adequate remedy at law” to compel 
documentary discovery was lacking.39  Although an 1861 federal statute 
																																																																																																																												
 35 Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 241 Fed. 964, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).  
After recognizing that he “cannot compel” an oral examination of an adversary before 
trial, Judge Hand speculated that “the same result [an effective method of discovery] may 
probably be obtained, though it must be confessed with the maximum of expense in time 
and labor, by allowing interrogatories to be renewed as often as justice requires.”  Id. 
 36 Kessler, supra note 9, at 1216–17; 3 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF EVIDENCE 364 (16th ed. 1899) (“[A]ccording to the course of chancery, the testimony 
of the witness is taken upon interrogatories in writing, deliberately propounded to him by 
the examiner . . . .”). 
 37 For an account of the origins of the practice of allowing a party, rather than a 
court-appointed examiner, to conduct the examination, see discussion, infra, Part III. 
 38 In 1917 Judge Learned Hand described the proper procedure for a bill of discovery 
in aid of an action at law after Federal Equity Rule 58 came into force in 1912: 
[T]he proper practice in a bill of discovery is now as follows: The plaintiff 
will plead those facts which entitle him to a discovery from the defendant, 
and will annex such interrogatories as he wishes the defendant to answer. If 
the defendant does not dispute the plaintiff’s right to some discovery, but 
objects to some or all of the actual interrogatories annexed to the bill, he 
will make those objections under Rule 58, and bring them on for hearing 
before the judge. He is not subject to the rule that, by answering one, he 
must answer all. If, on the other hand, he disputes the plaintiff’s right to any 
discovery, he will plead in an answer such facts as he deems apposite, and 
obtain from the court, under Rule 58, an enlargement of his time to answer 
the interrogatories until the plaintiff’s right to discovery is established. 
Pressed Steel Car Co., 241 Fed. at 966–67. 
 39 United States v. Bitter Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451, 472 (1906). 
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incorporating Section 15 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 permitted courts of 
law to compel the discovery of documents, the Supreme Court held in 
1911 that the authorization to compel discovery of documents applied 
only at trial and that, under the statute, pretrial documentary discovery 
was not available.40 
III. THE ROLE OF THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE DEPOSITION AT 
EQUITY 
Under the 1938 Federal Rules, the officer in charge of conducting a 
deposition was responsible for taking down testimony, but lacked 
authority to do much else.41  In the respect that this officer functions as a 
recorder of evidence, the person who presides over the modern American 
oral deposition resembles the lay examiner appointed by the English 
Court of Chancery to discharge an evidence-gathering function.  The 
English examiner orally administered a written, party-prepared 
interrogatory upon an adverse party without the presence of counsel, 
recorded a written summary of the examinant’s oral answers and 
transmitted that record to the court. 42   In modern American practice 
under the 1938 Rules, in contrast, counsel for the examining party asks 
questions orally of the examinant, but the questioner does not record the 
answers for the court.43 
																																																																																																																												
 40 Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533, 537–38 (1911) (citing U.S. REV. STAT. § 724, U. 
S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 583) (“In the trial of actions at law, the courts of the United States 
may, on motion and due notice thereof, require the parties to produce books or writings in 
their possession or power, which contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in cases and 
under circumstances where they might be compelled to produce the same by the ordinary 
rules of proceeding in chancery. If a plaintiff fails to comply with such order, the court 
may, on motion, give the like judgment for the defendant as in cases of nonsuit; and if a 
defendant fails to comply with such order, the court may, on motion, give judgment 
against him by default.”) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1934)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
(corresponds to the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 15, 1 Stat. 73) (“That all the said 
courts of the United States, shall have power in the trial of actions at law, on motion and 
due notice thereof being given, to require the parties to produce books or writings in their 
possession or power, which contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in cases and under 
circumstances where they might be compelled to produce the same by the ordinary rules 
of proceeding in chancery.”).  The Court recognized that the purpose of the statute was to 
provide a “substitute for a bill of discovery in aid of a legal action,” but nevertheless 
concluded that § 15 of the Judiciary Act only applied at trial.  Carpenter, 221 U.S. at 537, 
545. 
 41 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) (1938) (“The officer before whom the deposition is to be 
taken shall put the witness on oath and shall personally, or by some one acting under his 
direction and in his presence, record the testimony of the witness.  The testimony shall be 
taken stenographically and transcribed unless the parties agree otherwise.”). 
 42 See, infra, Part III.A. 
 43 Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(1). 
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In order to understand the choices that the drafters of the Rules 
made regarding regulating who would question witnesses and under what 
conditions, it is helpful to review the pre-1938 English and American 
practices with respect to the role of the officer in charge of the 
examination, including the origin of permitting a party (or the party’s 
counsel) to conduct the examination. 
A. The English Examiner at Equity 
The English Court of Chancery appointed examiners to gather 
evidence for the court. 44   By the sixteenth century, the court was 
employing lay examiners to gather evidence by administering party-
propounded interrogatories.45  Beginning in the later sixteenth century, 
lay examiners only took examinations in London and the immediate 
vicinity, and by the middle of the seventeenth century, examination by 
commission was the “norm outside of London.”46  By the seventeenth 
century, the practice was for the parties to nominate four commissioners 
each, from whom the court would select two of each. 47   Although 
examination on commission “was still to be considered as examination 
by persons authorised by and under the control of the court,” during the 
seventeenth century “there was in Chancery . . . something of a shift 
away from a view of commissioners as judicial officers, to one of them 
as perhaps somewhat suspect party nominees.”48 
Although a party or counsel drafted the interrogatory, the party did 
not conduct the examination.  Rather, the examination was conducted 
outside the presence of parties and counsel.49  At the examination, the 
																																																																																																																												
 44 JOHN G. HENDERSON, CHANCERY PRACTICE WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE 
OFFICE AND DUTIES OF MASTERS IN CHANCERY, REGISTERS, AUDITORS, COMMISSIONERS 
IN CHANCERY, COURT COMMISSIONERS, MASTER COMMISSIONERS, REFEREES, ETC. 163 
(1904). The court appointed examiners in part to relieve the court’s heavy workload.  Id.  
Early Chancery lawyers would have conceived of discovery as documents and testimony 
that were produced to the court, rather to an adverse party.  See Ian Eagles, Disclosure of 
Material Obtained on Discovery, 47 MOD. L. REV. 284, 286 (1984). 
 45 JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 151 (1960); see MICHAEL R. T. 
MACNAIR, THE LAW OF PROOF IN EARLY MODERN EQUITY 173 (1999) (stating that equity 
followed the “principle that the examination of witnesses was to be by officers of the 
court and not by the parties or their agents.”). 
 46 MACNAIR, supra note 45, at 173; see also DAWSON, supra note 45, at 151–59 
(describing Chancery examinations both in London and in the country). 
 47 MACNAIR, supra note 45, at 174.  Dawson states that in the sixteenth century the 
Court of Chancery would “appoint a commission of four lay persons, two named by each 
of the parties.”  DAWSON, supra note 45, at 151–52. 
 48 Id. at 175–74. 
 49 ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 270 (1952). 
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examiner or the commissioner propounded to the examinant questions 
that had been prepared by the party seeking the evidence.  The examiner 
or commissioner then summarized the testimony in a report submitted to 
the court.50 
B. Examinations in the Federal Courts of Equity 
1. General Method of Obtaining Proof 
After the American Revolution, the equity side of the federal courts 
continued the English practice of using court-appointed officers to 
administer party-propounded written interrogatories to witnesses.  
Although the Judiciary Act of 1789 prescribed that “[t]hat the mode of 
proof by oral testimony and examination of witnesses in open court shall 
be the same in all the courts of the United States, as well in the trial of 
causes in equity . . . as of actions at common law,”51 the 1822 Federal 
Equity Rules provided for the traditional Chancery method of obtaining 
testimony.52  The 1912 amendments mandated that all testimony was to 
be taken orally, in open court.53 
2. Person Conducting the Examination 
The 1842 Federal Equity Rules permitted a party (or the party’s 
counsel), as opposed to a court-appointed officer, to conduct the 
questioning during an examination.54  This practice departed from the 
traditional mode of examination at equity by permitting the court-
appointed officer to conduct an oral examination rather than administer 
written interrogatories.  Consequently, the person asking the questions 
could react to the witness’s answers and pose follow-up questions, and 
not be constrained by the written interrogatory.  Additionally, the parties 
																																																																																																																												
 50 See Kessler, supra note 9, at 1207. 
 51 Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 40, § 30, 1 Stat. 73, 88 (1789). 
 52 JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 40–41 (8th ed. 1933) 
(citing FED. R. EQ. 25 (1822) (“Testimony may be taken according to the acts of 
Congress, or under a commission.”) (replaced by FED. R. EQ. 81 (1912) (“Witnesses who 
live within the district may, upon due notice of the opposite party, be summoned to 
appear before the commissioners appointed to take testimony, or before a master or 
examiner appointed in any cause . . . .”) (amended 1912))). 
 53 See supra note 24. 
 54 See HOPKINS, supra note 52, at 56 (citing  FED. R. EQ. 67 (1842) (“If the parties 
shall so agree, the testimony may be taken upon oral interrogatories by the parties or their 
agents, without filing any written interrogatories.”) (amended 1912)).  The default mode 
of gathering evidence – a court-appointed officer administering a party-propounded 
written interrogatory to the witness – was still available.  See id. (“After the cause is at 
issue, commissions to take testimony may be taken out . . . ”). 
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and their counsel, who had been forbidden from attending the pretrial 
examination,55 began to ask questions at the examination. 
Amalia Kessler has suggested that the oral examination may have 
had its roots in early nineteenth-century New York equity practice.56  In 
Remsen v. Remsen, 57  Chancellor Kent stated that masters had been 
conducting oral examinations rather than administering written 
interrogatories.58  Kent indicated that the practice developed because an 
oral examination was more convenient and flexible than the use of 
written interrogatories.59  He described the inconveniences and rigidity of 
the written interrogatory: “[In] long and complicated accounts . . . it 
seems almost impossible to reduce the requisite inquiries to writing, in 
the first instance, and to know what questions to put, except as they arise 
in the progress of the inquiry.”60  Several state courts cited Remsen for 
the proposition that masters were authorized to conduct oral 
examinations.61 
Kent also relaxed the restriction on the presence of parties at the 
examination.  Parties and their counsel were permitted to attend oral 
examinations, although the court reserved the right to exclude them.62  
Kessler speculates that Kent allowed the presence of the parties in order 
to “maintain the role that litigants (or their counsel) traditionally had in 
framing written interrogatories.”63  One treatise writer described Remsen 
as establishing a process in which the master and the litigants 
collaborated.64 
Two kinds of officers could, under the 1842 Federal Equity Rules, 
be in charge of depositions: masters and commissioners.  Rule 77 
provided that a master “shall have full authority . . . to examine on oath, 
																																																																																																																												
 55 See MILLAR, supra note 49, at 270. 
 56 See Kessler, supra note 9, at 1225–26. 
 57 2 Johns. Ch. 495 (N.Y. Ch. 1817). 
 58 Id. at 497–98.  In Remsen, Kent wrote that even though “the exhibition of 
interrogatories, duly settled, be the usual mode of examination, appearing in the books, I 
do not apprehend that it is indispensable.”  Id. at 499.  “The practice with us,” Kent 
continued, “has been more relaxed, and oral examinations have frequently, if not 
generally, prevailed.”  Id. 
 59 See id. (noting that the practice of masters conducting oral examinations was “a 
question merely of convenience”). 
 60 Id. at 500. 
 61 Kessler, supra note 9, at 1226 n. 245. 
 62 Remsen, supra note 57, at 502. (“The testimony may be taken in the presence of 
the parties, or their counsel” unless “a special order of the Court” required that “it is to be 
taken secretly.”) 
 63 Kessler, supra note 9, at 1229. 
 64 See HENDERSON, supra note 44, at 250 (stating that the parties and the master 
together determine which method of examination would be “most expedient”). 
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viva voce, all witnesses produced by the parties before him.”65  Although 
this rule authorized the master to conduct the examination, courts 
interpreted the rule to permit parties to conduct the questioning.66  A 
commissioner was the American analogue to the English lay examiner 
because the commissioner administered written interrogatories and 
summarized testimony.  Under Rule 67, a party could conduct the 
examination in lieu of the commissioner.67  The 1842 Federal Equity 
Rules authorized parties to conduct oral examinations before either a 
master or a commissioner.68 
In 1861 the Supreme Court made it easier for a party to conduct an 
oral examination.  The 1842 version of Federal Equity Rule 67 had 
required that both parties agree to an examination upon oral 
interrogatories.69  The Court amended that rule to provide that only one 
party had to request an oral examination in order to obtain it.70  The older 
method of employing written interrogatories remained available to 
litigants, but only if there was a “special reason” for using that method.71  
By 1861, therefore, federal courts of equity permitted parties to conduct 
oral examinations while a court-appointed examiner summarized the 
testimony.72 
The 1912 amendments to the Equity Rules established the rule that 
oral testimony in open court would be the typical method for gathering 
evidence.73  Rule 47 directed that depositions could be taken only “for 
good and exceptional cause.”74  As Wayne Brazil has shown, although a 
																																																																																																																												
 65 HOPKINS, supra note 52, at 58–59 (citing FED. R. EQ. 77 (1842) (amended 1912)). 
 66 See, e.g., Foote v. Silsby, 9 F. Cas. 391 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1856) (No. 4,920) (“Under 
the 77th rule prescribed by the [S]upreme [C]ourt for the observance of the circuit courts 
in equity cases, the plaintiff had a right, without special order, to call and examine the 
defendants . . . ”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, Silsby v. Foote, 61 U.S. 378 (1858). 
 67 See supra note 54. 
 68 Fed. R. Eq. 67, 77 (1842).  The English Court of Chancery was similarly reformed 
to permit obtaining evidence by oral examination.  See Kessler, supra, note 9, at 1236. 
 69 Fed. R. Eq. 67 (1842) (“If the parties shall so agree . . . .”). 
 70 66 U.S. (1 Black) 6 (1861) (“Either party may give notice to the other that he 
desires the evidence to be adduced in the cause to be taken orally, and thereupon all the 
witnesses to be examined shall be examined before one of the examiners of the court, or 
before an examiner to be specially appointed by the court . . . .”). 
 71 See id. at 7 (“Testimony may be taken on commission in the usual way, by written 
interrogatories and cross-interrogatories, on motion to the court . . .  for special reasons, 
satisfactory to the court . . . .”). 
 72 Id. (“The depositions taken upon such oral examination shall be taken down in 
writing by the examiner, in the form of narrative, unless he determines the examination 
shall be by question and answer in special instances.”). 
 73 See RUSH, supra note 24 (citing FED. R. EQ. 46). 
 74 See RUSH, supra note 23 (citing FED. R. EQ. 47 (1912).  Depositions continued to 
be taken under this rule.  See Reflectolyte Co. v. Edwin F. Guth Co., 31 F.2d 777, 778 
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master was authorized to preside over the taking of a deposition under 
Rule 47, the federal courts “confined use of special masters almost 
exclusively to conventional references of complex matters at the trial 
stage.”75  The basic structure of a deposition, in which parties (or their 
counsel) ask questions while a court-appointed functionary records the 
witness’s testimony, thus persisted past the final revision of the Federal 
Equity Rules before the Federal Rules united the procedures at law and 
equity. 
The Federal Equity Rules pertained to obtaining proof by oral 
examination (the preservation of potential testimony function), rather 
than to obtaining discovery by oral examination (the investigation of 
potential evidence function).  Under the nineteenth-century rules, the 
word “deposition” referred to the examiner’s report.76  When the drafters 
of the 1938 Federal Rules united, in one examination procedure, the 
preservation of potential testimony function and the investigation of 
potential evidence function,77 a precedent existed for a party-directed 
oral examination in which an officer of the court recorded testimony.78  
Although the Advisory Committee was not constrained by existing 
practice – the Committee members could have created a radically 
innovative procedure – two aspects of existing equity procedure 
influenced the debate over whether the 1938 Rules should provide for a 
master to rule upon the admissibility of evidence at depositions:79 the 
practice of permitting parties to conduct the examination, and the 
presence of a court-appointed functionary without any powers and 
																																																																																																																												
(E.D. Mo. 1927); see also Wallace R. Lane, Working Under Federal Equity Rules, 29 
HARV. L. REV. 55, 70-71 (1915). 
 75 Wayne D. Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks to Special Masters: Is Rule 53 a 
Source of Authority and Restrictions?, 8 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 143, 155 (1983).  
Brazil also found that masters were not involved in the documentary discovery 
procedures provided for in Rule 58.  See supra text accompanying note 28.  The rule 
provided that the judge was supposed to settle disputes about interrogatories and 
document requests, and Brazil found “only one reported case from the period between 
1912 and 1938 that even mentions using a master in connection with a document 
production.”  Brazil, supra, at 159 (citing Pressed Steel Car Co., 240 F. at 137) 
 76 See 66 U.S. (1 Black) 6 (1861) (stating that after the examination is concluded “the 
original depositions, authenticated by the signature of the examiner, shall be transmitted 
by him to the clerk of the court . . . ”) (emphasis added). 
 77 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1938) (“testimony . . . may be taken . . . by deposition upon 
oral examination . . . for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or 
for both purposes.”). 
 78 See, supra, Part III.B. 
 79 See Part V, infra. 
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responsibilities other than swearing in witness and taking down 
testimony.80 
C. Persons Subject to Examination for Discovery 
A party could seek discovery only from another party, because only 
persons with an interest in the action could be examined.  According to a 
leading nineteenth-century English treatise, “[f]rom the earliest times it 
has been a general rule . . . that no person without an interest could be 
made a defendant to a bill for the purpose of discovery.”81   George 
Ragland, whose 1932 book Discovery Before Trial was the only 
significant American treatise about pretrial discovery known at the time, 
wrote that “[d]iscovery could be had only from parties under the 
[American] chancery practice.”82  A non-party witness was therefore not 
subject to oral examination for discovery.  A non-party witness was, 
however, subject to oral examination for the purposes of gathering 
testimony, which was the manner in which the courts of equity gathered 
evidence. 
At common law a party to a suit was disqualified from testifying at 
trial because the party had an interest in the litigation and might have 
therefore been tempted to perjure himself.83  Obtaining discovery of an 
																																																																																																																												
 80 For an argument that the Federal Rules represent the triumph of equitable 
procedure over common law procedure, see Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered 
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. 
PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
 81 EDWARD BRAY, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF DISCOVERY 40 (1885).  
“Interest” meant “such an interest as that a decree could be made against him or as that he 
might be affected by the decree.”  Id. at 40–41. 
 82 GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 46 (1932).  The Advisory 
Committee relied on Ragland’s book during its deliberations regarding discovery rules.  
See Part IV.D, infra. 
 83 For thorough coverage of the decline of the disqualification, see George Fisher, 
The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 659–61 (1997) (describing the 
downfall of witness competency rules in civil cases).  Fisher has argued that the 
disqualification of civil parties for interest dates to before the sixteenth century: 
Exactly when the rules evolved is unclear.  Wigmore traced the rule barring 
civil parties to the sixteenth century and that barring all other interested 
persons to the mid-seventeenth century.  But it seems that these dates 
merely mark the earliest references Wigmore could find; the rules may well 
have been older. Barbara Shapiro notes that the rules bear a close, if 
simplified, resemblance to the testimonial disqualifications that prevailed in 
the Roman-canon law of the Continent. 
Id. at 625 (citations omitted).  Michael Macnair has suggested that Wigmore dates the 
disqualification of parties too early and the disqualification of interested persons too late.  
See MACNAIR, supra note 45, at 204–211.  See also James Oldham, Truth-Telling in the 
Eighteenth-Century English Courtroom, 12 L. & HIST. REV. 95, 107–17 (1994). 
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adverse party in an action at law would, therefore, have been the only 
opportunity for the party requesting discovery to learn what the 
adversary knew.  New York’s Field Code of 1848 provided for pretrial 
oral examinations of adverse parties as a substitute for testimony at 
trial. 84   Because the drafters of the Field Code presumed that the 
pleadings would properly frame the issues in the case, the Code did not 
include any provisions for interrogatories.85 
D. Applicability of Rules of Evidence at an Examination 
The rules of evidence govern the admissibility of testimony and 
prevent the fact-finder from considering inadmissible testimony.  At the 
pretrial oral examination, the judge was absent, and neither a master nor 
an examiner could rule on evidence.86  According to one treatise writer, 
“the rules governing the admissibility or rejection of evidence before a 
master or a referee are precisely the same as in a trial before the court.”87  
If an adverse party objects to the “competency or admissibility” of 
evidence “at the hearing before the master,” the master “should receive 
the evidence, subject to the objection [by the adverse party], and the 
court would be able then to pass upon the matter on review.”88  It was 
well-established that examiners were incompetent to rule on the 
admissibility of evidence.  Under the 1912 amendments to Federal 
Equity Rules 49 and 51, the examiner before whom a deposition was 
																																																																																																																												
 84 1848 N.Y. Laws, c. 379 (71st Sess., April 12, 1848) [hereinafter “1848 Field 
Code”] § 345.  The examination would be taken “subject to the same rules of 
examination, as any other witness.”  Id. § 344. 
 85 Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis 
of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 311, 332 (1988). 
 86 Wisconsin and Missouri had provisions in their procedural codes that permitted, 
under limited circumstance, the officer in charge of the deposition to rule on the 
admissibility of evidence.  See MO. REV. STAT. (1919) § 5446; WIS. STAT. (1927) c. 252, 
§ 1415; RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 106 (Wisconsin), 107–08 (Missouri). 
 87 HENDERSON, supra note 44, at 296. “So, also, hearsay evidence is no more 
admissible upon a hearing before the master than upon a trial in court.”  Id.  In De la Riva 
v. Berreyessa, Chief Justice Murray of the Supreme Court of California held that 
testimony that would be inadmissible at trial was also inadmissible at a pretrial 
examination: “It appears . . . that testimony, though objected to, was admitted to establish 
a demand for the price of wheat which was barred by the statute of limitations. The 
record discloses much hearsay and irrelevant testimony, which should have been 
excluded.”  2 Cal. 195, 197 (Cal. 1852). 
 88 HENDERSON, supra note 44, at 325 (quoting Kansas Loan & Trust Co. v. Electric 
Ry., Light & Power Co. of Sedalia, MO, 108 F. 702 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1901)). The court’s 
reference to an “objection” by “the adverse party” is a reminder that by 1901 counsel was 
present at oral examinations. 
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taken had no authority to exclude evidence or to rule that a deponent 
need not answer a question.89 
IV. EXPANSION OF DISCOVERY UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
A. The Enabling Act and The Advisory Committee 
On June 19, 1934 Congress passed the Enabling Act, which 
authorized the Supreme Court to establish new rules of procedure for the 
district courts.90  The legislation empowered the Court “at any time [to] 
unite the general rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with those 
actions at law.”91  The Act also directed that the new rules “shall neither 
abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.”92 
On June 3, 1935, the Supreme Court appointed an Advisory 
Committee “to prepare and submit to the Court a draft of a unified 
system of rules . . . .” 93   Former U.S. Attorney General William D. 
Mitchell was named to chair the Committee. 94   The Reporter to the 
Advisory Committee was Charles Clark, the Dean of Yale Law School at 
the time. 95   Edson Sunderland, a member of the Committee and a 
professor at the University of Michigan Law School, was the primary 
drafter of the discovery rules.96 
																																																																																																																												
 89 ARMISTEAD M. DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 721 
(1928). 
 90 “Be it enacted that the Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to 
prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the United States and for the courts of 
the District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the 
practice and procedure in civil actions at law.”  ACT OF JUNE 19, 1934, c. 651, §1, 48 Stat. 
1064, 28 U.S.C. § 723b (subsequently 28 U.S.C. § 2072). 
 91 Id. § 2.  In 1922, Chief Justice Taft had recommended that the federal system 
adopt a 
procedure that merged law and equity.  William Howard Taft, Possible and Needed 
Reforms in the Administration of Justice in Federal Courts, 8 A.B.A. J. 601, 47 A.B.A. 
REP. 250 (1922). 
 92 ACT OF JUNE 19, 1934, at § 2.  For a discussion of how the new Federal Rules were 
interpreted to erode the right to jury trial, see Subrin, supra note 79, at 929–31. 
 93 Order Appointing Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules, 
295 U.S. 774 (1934). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Clark, supra note 13, at 10 (“Thus with the Chairman’s approval I was able to 
commission Edson to prepare the draft of that part of the rules known originally as “V. 
DEPOSITIONS, DISCOVERY AND SUMMARY JUDGMENTS.”“).  Sunderland was a Sterling 
Foundation Research Associate at Yale Law School from 1931 until 1933.  Id. at 7. 
The other members of the Committee included: former U.S. Attorney General George 
Wickersham (who died in 1936 and was replaced by George Pepper); Scott Loftin, the 
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B. A Note Regarding Sources 
The official documentary records of the Advisory Committee’s 
deliberations are located at the Federal Records Center in Suitland, 
Maryland.97   In 1938 Chief Justice Hughes placed that collection of 
archival material under seal; the collection remained, as of 1983, 
inaccessible to the general public, but the materials appear to have been 
opened up by 1993.98  Although it is not clear why the Supreme Court 
had the records sealed, the Advisory Committee was self-conscious of 
the private nature of its deliberations.99 
A second, substantial set of Committee records exists at Sterling 
Memorial Library, Yale University. 100  Charles Clark, the reporter to the 
																																																																																																																												
President of the American Bar Association; Wilbur Cherry, Professor of Law at the 
University of Minnesota; Armistead M. Dobie, Dean of the University of Virginia Law 
School; Robert Dodge, a Boston lawyer; George Donworth, a former federal judge in 
Seattle; Joseph Gamble, a Des Moines lawyer; Monte Lemann, a New Orleans lawyer 
who taught at the Tulane University Law School; Edmund Morgan, Professor of Law at 
Harvard Law School; Warren Olney, Jr., a San Francisco lawyer and founding member of 
the Sierra Club; and Edgar Tolman, a Chicago lawyer and editor-in-chief of the American 
Bar Association Journal. 
 97 See The Washington National Records Center at Suitland Maryland, NATIONAL 
ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/dc-metro/suitland/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2013). 
 98 See Brazil, supra note 75, at 160 n.113 (indicating that as of 1983 the collection 
remained inaccessible to the general public and that “to date [1983], no scholar has been 
permitted to quote any portion of these records”).  Peter Charles Hoffer reported in 1993 
that he was able to obtain a duplication of the full transcription of the Committee’s 
deliberations from 1935 to 1937, which Edgar Tolman, the secretary of the Committee, 
had deposited with the Supreme Court and which were archived at Suitland.  Peter 
Charles Hoffer, Text, Translation, Context, Conversation, Preliminary Notes for 
Decoding the Deliberations of the Advisory Committee that Wrote the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 409, 413-414 n.22 (1993).  Hoffer was also able 
to obtain copies of “all the drafts of the rules prepared by Clark and his staff, and the 
comments of members of the bench and bar in the various judicial circuits to those 
drafts . . . .”  Id. 
 99 Subrin, supra note 10, at 718 n. 159 (quoting Summary of Proceedings of the First 
Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules, Held in the Federal Building at Chicago, 
June 20, 1935, in Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference: Committees on Rules of 
Practice and Procedures, 1935-1988, at CI-103-42-46 (Congressional Information 
Service) (“It was thereupon unanimously resolved, that as the committee is acting in an 
advisory capacity only, no publicity be given to any action or decision taken by it, except 
to the extent authorized by the Supreme Court.”)).  At least one court has made use of 
documents in the Clark Papers to inform its interpretation of the Federal Rules.  See 
Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 684 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
 100 The documents are housed in the Manuscripts and Archives Division of Sterling 
Memorial Library (Manuscript Group Number 1344).  An archivist-prepared finding aid 
to the records, which consist of 38 boxes, was completed in March 1982 and may be 
found at: http://drs.library.yale.edu:8083/HLTransformer/HLTransServlet?stylename=yul
.ead2002.xhtml.xsl&pid=mssa:ms.1344&query=charles%20e.%20clark&clear-stylesheet
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Advisory Committee while he was the dean of Yale Law School, 
preserved 38 boxes of material.101  The Clark Papers include reports, 
memoranda, abstracts, transcripts and minutes of the Advisory 
Committee’s meetings, preliminary drafts of the rules, and 
correspondence that the Committee received from lawyers and judges, 
including suggestions regarding proposed rules.102  The archive contains 
verbatim transcripts of the Committee’s proceedings that occurred 
between November 1935 and February 1937 103  and correspondence 
dating from the period September 1934 to September 1939.104 
The Clark Papers contain the two published preliminary drafts of 
the proposed rules that the Advisory Committee circulated in order to 
elicit comments and suggestions from lawyers and judges: a May 1936 
“Preliminary Draft” 105  and an April, 1937 draft titled “Proposed 
Rules.”106  The Proposed Rules reflected changes that the Committee 
made after reviewing the suggestions from the legal profession.107 
Before publishing the “Preliminary Draft,” the Committee debated 
several unpublished earlier drafts.  I discuss these versions, which are 
included in the Clark Papers, in this article.  The draft rules pertaining to 
the powers of the officer in charge of the deposition are collected at 
Appendix A, below. 
																																																																																																																												
-cache=yes&hlon=yes&big=&adv=&filter=&hitPageStart=1&sortFields=&view=c01_4#
ref501 (last visited, Feb. 5, 2012). 
 101 Hereinafter CLARK PAPERS.  The archivists at Yale have divided the 38 boxes into 
three chronological sections: 1935–1939; 1943–1950; 1952–1956.  I have only consulted 
the first section, boxes 94 to 113. 
 102 In addition to the official documents at the Federal Records Center and the Clark 
Papers, less complete collections of records from the Committee’s work exist.  See 
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1132–33 
n.529 (1982) (describing sets of documents at Chicago, Michigan, Virginia, and other 
locations). 
 103 CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, boxes 94–96. 
 104 Id. at boxes 106–13.  “Preparatory papers,” including preliminary drafts of the 
rules, make up the bulk of the remainder of the portion of the archive relevant to the 
period 1935–1938.  Id. at boxes 97–105. 
 105 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (May 1936) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY 
DRAFT]. 
 106 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (April 
1937) [hereinafter PROPOSED RULES]. 
 107 See FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(Nov. 1937) (reflecting primarily stylistic changes to its April 1937 PROPOSED RULES, 
supra note ). 
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C. Expansion of Availability of and Scope of Oral Examination for 
Discovery 
1. Edson Sunderland: A Proponent of Liberal Discovery 
Edson Sunderland, the principal framer of the Federal Rules 
pertaining to discovery,108 was a strong proponent of expansive discovery 
as a means to eliminate surprise at trial.  He wrote in 1933 that “effective 
preliminary discovery” would increase the efficiency of trial.109 Under a 
liberal discovery system in which all parties were aware of the facts, it 
would be possible to dispense with “that elaborate maneuvering for 
advantage, that vigilant and tireless eagerness to insist on every 
objection, which not only prolongs and complicates the trial but makes 
the outcome turn more upon the skill of counsel than upon the merits of 
the case.”110 
Sunderland also advocated more liberal discovery than was 
available before the Federal Rules because he believed that pleadings 
were an inadequate method of framing issues for trial.111  The function of 
pleadings consisted of framing the issues in the case and disclosure of the 
parties’ view of the evidence.  The pleadings thus could be an 
opportunity for a party to conceal information.112  The virtues of liberal 
discovery included the disclosure of actual evidence and the ability of the 
parties to directly assess its merits.  More thorough investigation of the 
evidence would promote settlement and reduce the need for trial.  
Sunderland had been impressed by the efficiency of the English 
“summons for direction,” a type of pretrial conference with a standing 
master.113 
																																																																																																																												
 108 On the twentieth anniversary of the Federal Rules, Clark wrote: the “original 
conception [of Rule 16], as well as the several rules for discovery and summary 
judgment, was and now remains a tribute to Edson’s genius.”  Clark, supra note 13, at 10. 
 109 See Edson R. Sunderland, Improving the Administration of Civil Justice, 167 
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 60, 74 (1933) 
(“[A] trial which follows an effective preliminary discovery gains much in efficiency.”). 
 110 Id. at 74.  “With the facts on each side understood by both parties when the trial 
opens, leading questions lose their objectionable character, the witnesses can be brought 
at once to the main points in controversy with no waste of time over formal matters, the 
necessity for cross-examination is greatly reduced, and the actual introduction of proof 
may often be dispensed with altogether.”  Id. at 74–75 (emphasis added). 
 111 See Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial: 
Inadequacy of the Pleadings as a Basis for Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863 (1933). 
 112 The Federal Rules debased pleading.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (1938) (amended 
2010). 
 113 Edson R. Sunderland, An Appraisal of English Procedure, 9 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 164, 
167 (1925).  According to Sunderland: 
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Sunderland believed that reforming the pretrial phase of litigation 
in such a way that the procedures governing discovery before trial 
mimicked those in use at trial itself would result in the improved 
administration of justice.  In 1933 he endorsed establishing such a 
pretrial discovery procedure. 114   During the Advisory Committee’s 
deliberations, Sunderland consistently supported broad, rather than 
restricted, rights to discovery.115  Writing in 1932, Sunderland alluded to 
the “widespread fear of liberalizing discovery,” stating that “hostility to 
‘fishing expeditions’ before trial is a traditional and powerful taboo” and 
that only “experience” would effectively neutralize such hostility. 116 
Clark shared Sunderland’s enthusiasm for broad rights to discovery.  
The Advisory Committee held its first meeting on June 20, 1935 and as 
early as June 28 Clark indicated his preference for liberal discovery 
provisions.  When he prepared his “tentative” outline of the subjects to 
be dealt with by the new rules, Clark included a section on “Discovery 
and Summary Proceedings.”  With respect to the topics “Discovery, 
Summary Judgment, and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment Supported 
by Affidavits,” Clark wrote a note on the outline that said: “Liberal 
provisions should be drafted on all these matters.  Cf. RAGLAND, 
DISCOVERY (1931).”117 
																																																																																																																												
There is nothing in the English court system which proceeds under such 
speed and pressure as a hearing before a master on a summons for 
directions.  The solicitors are not allowed the luxury of a seat, but stand at a 
sort of high desk before the master, and are hardly given time to gather up 
their papers before the next group of solicitors has crowded forward to take 
their place. Each of the masters has a docket of sixteen or eighteen cases per 
hour, and he usually finishes the list on time. The summons for directions, 
by which the vast scheme of discovery is largely administered, is thus a 
tremendously efficient instrument. 
Id. 
 114 Sunderland, supra note 110, at 877 (“[I]t is also possible to preserve that 
correlation [between scope and method of discovery] by changing both, authorizing a 
discovery as broad in its scope as the trial itself, and providing the same method of 
examination which is employed in trial practice.  This is the solution which has been 
found for the problem in a group of jurisdictions of which Wisconsin is the most 
conspicuous example.  Discovery has by this means become a widely used system of pre-
trial procedure which has profoundly affected the administration of justice.”). 
 115 See, e.g., Transcript of Advisory Committee Meeting at 740 (Feb. 22, 1936), in 
CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95 (Sunderland objecting to Pepper and Mitchell’s 
tentative suggestion that the judge should be able to “define the things you can fish 
about”). 
 116 Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword, in RAGLAND, supra note 81, at iii. 
 117 Supreme Court of the United States Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil 
Procedure Topical Outline of Proposed Rules (June 28, 1935) 1, 5 in CLARK PAPERS, 
supra note 100, at Box 108.  It is not clear to whom Clark was addressing his note – it 
may have been a note to himself. 
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2. The Liberal Discovery Policy of the Federal Rules118 
The Federal Rules authorized the use of “virtually every known 
discovery method.”119  The Advisory Committee redefined the function 
of the oral deposition, by uniting both the preservation of potential 
testimony function and the investigation of potential evidence function 
into a single examination procedure.120 
The Federal Rules expanded, with respect to the oral deposition, 
both the scope of what information was discoverable121 and the range of 
persons subject to discovery (both parties and non-party witnesses).122  
Because the oral deposition under the Federal Rules combined the 
investigatory examination for discovery with the examination to gather 
and preserve testimony, the federal statute that restricted the 
circumstance under which a party could take a deposition de bene esse 
was repealed.123  In addition, the previous “privilege against disclosure of 
one’s case” – the rule that a party could only obtain discovery of matters 
related to the discoveror’s case – no longer applied under the Federal 
Rules.124  At the Advisory Committee’s meeting on February 22, 1936, 
																																																																																																																												
 118 I focus in this section on the oral deposition. 
 119 Subrin, supra note 10, at 300.  These methods included “interrogatories, oral 
depositions, written depositions, document requests, physical and mental examinations, 
inspection of property, and requests for admissions.”  Id.  Another commentator has 
likened the range of discovery devices available to an arsenal of weapons: “A veritable 
arsenal of weapons for discovery is provided [by the 1938 Rules], from which a skilled 
lawyer may select those best suited for his purpose, just as an experienced golfer chooses 
the club which best fits his immediate needs.”  Alexander Holtzoff, Instruments of 
Discovery under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 MICH. L. REV. 205, 205 (1942). 
 120 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (1938) (amended 2010) (“[T]he testimony of any 
person . . . may be taken at the instance of any party by deposition upon oral 
examination . . . for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for 
both purposes.”). 
 121 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1938) (amended 2010) (“[T]he deponent may be 
examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of the examining 
party or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, 
nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things 
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.”). 
 122 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (1938) (amended 2010) (“[T]he testimony of any person, 
whether a party or not, may be taken . . . ”) (emphasis added). 
 123 The Enabling Act had stated: “[the rules] shall take effect six months after their 
promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or 
effect. “  ACT OF JUNE 19, 1934, c. 651, §1, 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U.S.C. § 723b (subsequently 
28 U.S.C. § 2072). 
 124 James A. Pike, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure and the Rules of 
Evidence, 34 ILL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1939).  Ragland had described that, in New York, the 
restriction the defendant’s discovery to matters related to his affirmative defenses led to 
the practice of putting “in fictitious defenses for the sole purpose of securing an 
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Mitchell explained the difference between the preservation of potential 
testimony function and the investigation of potential evidence function, 
concluding that “there ought not to be any limit to taking a deposition to 
discover, no matter where the witness is.”125 
The Advisory Committee expanded discovery in two other ways.  
First, the drafters decided, consistent with equity practice,126 to adopt the 
rule that testimony to which a party objected would be recorded 
notwithstanding the objection.127  This rule permitted a party to inquire 
into facts that might be inadmissible evidence.  Although the law of 
evidence still nominally applied at the oral deposition,128 the officer in 
charge of the deposition had no power to rule on the admissibility of 
evidence.  Second, the drafters employed a broad standard of relevance 
regarding the matters into which a party was permitted to inquire.129  As 
a contemporary observer pointed out, “relevancy immediately 
presupposes a referent.”130  Because such a referent may be obscure at 
the pretrial phase of the litigation, any matter that may be relevant would 
fall within the ambit of Rule 26(b).  In 1946, this rule was amended to 
expand the standard of relevance: “[R]elevant information need not be 
																																																																																																																												
examination of his adversary,” a practice of which New York lawyers were critical.  
RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 132. 
 125 Advisory Committee Meeting Transcript (Feb. 1936), supra note 114, at 660–61. 
 126 See supra Part III.E.. 
 127 Fed R. Civ. P. 30(c) (1938) (amended 2007) (“All objections made at the time of 
the examination . . . shall be noted by the officer upon the deposition.  Evidence objected 
to shall be taken subject to the objections.”).  Accord Kansas Loan & Trust Co., 108 F. 
702) (directing that evidence at a hearing before a master be recorded despite an 
objection). 
 128 Technically, the “assimilation of discovery into the deposition mold . . . [brought] 
about the application of one law of evidence for both viva voce and pre-trial testimony.”  
Pike, supra note 123, at 7. 
 129 Fed R. Civ. P. 26(b), supra note 120 (subject to provisions intended to protect 
parties from abusive discovery, “the deponent may be examined regarding any matter not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . .”).  
See also Leverett v. Cont’l Briar Pipe Co., Inc., 25 F. Supp 80, 81–82 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) 
(interpreting Rule 26 to permit the “broadest type of examination” in “the field of 
depositions and discovery”).  The Committee had rejected two possible methods of 
limiting the scope of inquiry at the deposition: in 1935 Clark had initially proposed more 
rigorous pleading rules and tying the scope of discovery more closely to the allegations in 
the pleadings; also, Sunderland’s initial draft (also in 1935) of the oral deposition rule 
would have constrained discovery to “any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the 
pending cause as shown in the pleadings filed therein.”  See Subrin, supra 10, at 722-23. 
 130 Pike, supra note 123, at 3.  In federal equity practice the scope of what constituted 
relevant testimony was limited by the order of reference to the master.  See HENDERSON, 
supra note 44, at 325 (“[T]he master cannot hear evidence bearing on questions already 
settled in the order of reference relevance.”) (citing Remsen, 2 Johns. Ch. At 495.) 
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admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”131 
Sunderland and the Committee combined discovery devices and 
discovery policies that had been adopted by various jurisdictions.132  No 
single state procedural system in existence at the time of the drafting of 
the Federal Rules included all of the discovery provisions that the Rules 
would contain.  During the Advisory Committee’s campaign to gain 
public support for the preliminary draft of the Rules, Mitchell asserted 
that “[discovery] rules as liberal as those we have proposed have been in 
use in the English courts for many years” and that “similar systems are in 
effect in some States of the Union.” 133   In fact, the Federal Rules’ 
discovery provisions went farther than any other jurisdiction at the time, 
as Clark later admitted in 1959.134 
D. The Advisory Committee’s Sources 
Sunderland and other members of the Committee relied on 
Discovery Before Trial, 135  the book by Sunderland’s student, George 
Ragland, Jr.136  In his book, Ragland provided a survey of discovery rules 
																																																																																																																												
 131 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1946) (amended 2010) 
 132 Alexander Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057, 1072 (1955).  At the meeting of the Advisory Committee on 
April 17, 1935, Sunderland said of his first draft of the discovery procedure for the 
Federal Rules: “I think it is an advance over what any one of those states have.  But I 
think it is not an advance over what can be found in these states taken together.”  Id.  
With regard to source material, Holtzoff stated that he was “indebted to Mr. Leland L. 
Tolman, the Secretary of the Advisory Committee [of 1954] on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for access to the stenographic minutes of the meetings of the Committee.”  Id. 
at 1057.  Because Holtzoff quoted liberally from the minutes of meetings held by the 
original Advisory Committee, Leland Tolman must have had access to records of the 
1930s Committee. 
 133 William D. Mitchell, Attitude of Advisory Committee—Events Leading to Proposal 
for Uniform Rules—Problems on which Discussion is Invited [Address at the Open 
Session for Discussion of the Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal Courts], 
22 A.B.A. J. 780, 782 (1936). 
 134 Clark, supra note 13, at 11. (“The system thus envisaged by Sunderland had no 
counterpart at the time he proposed it.  It goes very much beyond English procedure, 
which does not provide for general depositions of parties or witnesses.  And only 
sporadically was there to be found here and there a suggestion for some part of the 
proposed system, but nowhere the fusion of the whole to make a complete system such as 
we ultimately presented.”). 
 135 See RAGLAND, supra note 81. 
 136 See, e.g., Preparatory Papers: Drafts, Reports and Correspondence used in the 
Preparation of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 
in CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 98 (citing Ragland’s book in a Note to Rule 30(c) 
(Officers Before Whom Depositions May be Taken) [see Appendix A, infra]).  See also 
text accompanying note 116, supra.  Sunderland wrote the foreword to Ragland’s book 
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and practices in all (at the time) forty-eight states, in the federal courts, in 
England, and in Ontario and Quebec. 137   In addition to gathering 
procedural rules and statutory and case law, Ragland undertook “field 
studies” in several North American cities to explore the experience “with 
each type of [discovery] device which is being used.”138  Ragland was an 
enthusiastic supporter of expanded discovery, quoting with approval a 
lawyer who had told him: “The lawyer who does not use discovery 
procedure is in the position of a physician who treats a serious case 
without first using the X-ray.”139 
1. Persons Subject to Examination for Discovery 
Consistent with the traditional rule at equity, 140  in all of the 
jurisdictions that Ragland studied, “adverse” parties were subject to 
examination for discovery. 141   Ragland reported that in Indiana, 
Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio and Texas, a party 
was permitted to take a deposition upon oral interrogatories of non-party 
witnesses, but the procedure he described was intended to preserve 
witness testimony, rather than to investigate potential evidence. 142  
Unlike the federal de bene esse statute, however, in those seven states a 
witness could be deposed regardless of whether he would be unavailable 
at trial.  The discovery rules in Wisconsin did not permit examination of 
																																																																																																																												
and Clark had published a positive review of it in 1933.  Charles E. Clark, Book Reviews, 
42 YALE L.J. 988 (1933) (reviewing GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 
(1932)). 
 137 See RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 267–391 (1932) (statutory provisions on discovery 
in these jurisdictions). 
 138 Id. at v.  Ragland undertook his field studies in cities in Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Ohio, Ontario, Quebec, Texas and Wisconsin.  Ragland’s studies included interviews 
with judges, lawyers, and – where available – officials in charge of discovery 
examinations.  Id. 
 139 RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 251.  Subrin has related Ragland’s procedural 
philosophy, which also included eliminating the “sporting theory of justice,” to the 
themes of Roscoe Pound’s 1906 speech The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
Administration of Justice.  Subrin, supra note 10, at 709-10. 
 140 See supra text accompanying note 80. 
 141 RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 37.  Thus, for example, a Wisconsin court found that a 
co-defendant could have been examined only if his interests are actually adverse.  O’Day 
v. Meyers, 147 Wis. 549 (1911).  In New Jersey and Louisiana, only the parties of record 
were subject to discovery.  See Apperson v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 38 N.J.L. 272 (Sup. 
Ct. 1876); LA. REV. CODE OF PRAC. § 347 (1927). 
 142 RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 50. 
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witnesses even though that state’s rules permitted liberal examination of 
parties and representatives of corporate parties.143 
2. Powers of the Presiding Officer at an Examination 
Ragland had reported that under the practices of Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Wisconsin, the officer in charge of 
the examination had the power to compel answers, decide objections, and 
rule on the admissibility of testimony.144  In Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
and Ohio, a notary presided over the examination and could hold an 
examinant in contempt for refusing to answer a question.145  Ragland 
indicated that it was very rare for a notary actually to punish an 
examinant and that the mere threat of contempt often compelled the 
examinant to answer the question.  Ragland suspected that a notary was 
reluctant to exercise his power to hold someone in contempt because the 
notary had no basis to know whether the particular question was proper, 
and may have been afraid of liability for wrongful committal.146 
In Wisconsin, a “court commissioner” – akin to a standing master – 
was in charge of an examination for discovery.147  In his field study, 
Ragland encountered three different understandings of how the 
commissioner was expected to respond to objections at an oral 
examination.148  Milwaukee lawyers believed that a commissioner had 
the same powers as a judge in chambers; the commissioner had the 
authority to rule on objections and punish for contempt.149  Madison 
lawyers believed that the commissioners only possessed the power to 
decide challenges to the relevance of a question.  Ragland reported that 
																																																																																																																												
 143 Id. at 47.  The Ontario history is intriguing: although the courts were empowered 
to grant discovery of witnesses “when it appears necessary for the purposes of justice,” in 
1894 the Supreme Court of Ontario overruled itself and reinstated the prohibition on 
discovery of witnesses. 
 144 Id. at 104-13. 
 145 Cf. Olmsted v. Edson, 98 N.W. 415, 417 (Neb. 1904) (stating that, like a judicial 
officer, a notary “is not liable for a mere error of judgment while acting within his 
jurisdiction but he is not protected if he assumes to act beyond the scope of his 
authority.”).  The sanction for contempt included imprisonment.  Id. at 416. 
 146 Id. at 104-13. 
 147 The court commissioner was an officer of the court appointed by the circuit judge.  
The commissioner held his office during the term of office of the appointing judge.  See 
WIS. STAT. § 1415 c. 252 (1927),. 
 148 RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 104–06. 
 149 In practice, the oral examinations for discovery in Milwaukee were supervised by 
reporters, whose primary task was to record testimony.  The reporters thus resembled the 
lay examiner appointed by the Court of Chancery in England or the examiner under the 
Federal Equity Rules.  In Milwaukee the parties would call in the commissioner when a 
dispute arose regarding the propriety of the questioning.  Id. at 106. 
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in Madison commissioners had ruled that they had no power to decide 
objections regarding competency, privilege, or hearsay.  In other parts of 
Wisconsin the perception among lawyers was that the court 
commissioner was not authorized to rule on objections and that the 
commissioner only noted objections in the record.150 
In Missouri, the party served with a notice of deposition was 
allowed, under certain circumstances, to apply to the court for the 
appointment of a “special commissioner” to supervise the 
examination.151  The option of applying to the court for the appointment 
of a special commissioner was only available in cities with a population 
of fifty thousand or more.152  The special commissioner had “power and 
authority to hear and determine all objections to testimony and evidence, 
and to admit and exclude the same, in the same manner and to the same 
extent as the circuit court might in a trial of said cause before said circuit 
court.”153  The special commissioner was “learned in law” and would 
“preside as an officer of the court at the taking of depositions,” ensuring 
“that the inquiry might be confined to the legitimate issues of the case 
and not range over other and impertinent fields.” 154   The option of 
requesting a special commissioner was thus a method of protecting an 
examinant from abusive discovery practices: a presiding officer applied 
the rules of evidence contemporaneously with the taking of deposition 
testimony. 
Ragland found that in several other jurisdictions,155 the officer in 
charge of the examination only played a ministerial role, such as 
swearing in the examinant and recording testimony.156  To the extent that 
																																																																																																																												
 150 Ragland proposed several explanations for the diversity of opinion in Wisconsin 
regarding the power of the court commissioners.  One explanation was that the courts in 
Milwaukee were too busy to decide objections arising out of discovery and that therefore 
the judges there encouraged the commissioners to issue rulings.  In Madison, Ragland 
indicated, the courts were able to entertain certifications of commissioners’ decision.  Id. 
 151 MO. REV. STAT. § 5446 (1919). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 State ex rel. Wilson v. Burney, 193 Mo. App. 326, 334 (1916). 
 155 California, Indiana, Kentucky, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ontario, Quebec, and 
Texas.  RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 97. 
 156 Ragland described the officer’s powers thus: 
[T]he officer in charge is a reporter with power only to swear the witness 
and preserve orderly conduct of the hearing; he has no power to compel 
answers or to decide objections to questions; if objections arise which 
cannot be decided among counsel, the examination is adjourned until a 
ruling can be obtained from the trial court. 
Id.  In every jurisdiction that Ragland studied, the officer in charge of the examination 
was responsible for swearing in the examinant.  Id. at 81. 
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this type of officer functioned as a stenographer without the power to 
adjudicate discovery disputes, he played the same role as the examiner in 
both English and federal equity practice.  In contrast, the master-like 
court commissioner in Wisconsin and the special commissioner in 
Missouri exercised authority of a quasi-judicial nature. 
In jurisdictions in which the officer in charge had no power to rule 
on objections, the officer would note an objection of counsel in the 
record.  Ragland recounted that, in case of an objection to a question, the 
lawyer who asked the question and the lawyer who objected to it would 
argue about the basis for the objection while the officer supervising the 
deposition played no role in the discussion.157  Typically the two lawyers 
would reach an agreement, but the proponent of the question could 
adjourn the deposition proceedings and bring a motion before the court 
to compel an answer: “[u]sually they [the lawyers] reach an agreement: 
the proponent either agrees to withdraw or restate the question or the 
opponent agrees to allow an answer subject to objection.”158 
Ragland favored “an assimilation of discovery procedure and 
deposition procedure . . . .” 159   He praised systems in which anyone 
authorized by statute to preside over depositions generally was also 
permitted to preside over depositions for discovery.  Ragland had 
recognized the efficiency of adapting a pre-existing functionary – the 
person in charge of the procedure to preserve testimony – to play the 
same role in a proceeding that combined the preservation of potential 
testimony function with the investigation of potential evidence function.  
The fact that the federal courts did not employ personnel similar to the 
commissioners in Wisconsin and Missouri was one of the reasons why 
the Advisory Committee ultimately rejected a rule expressly modeled on 
the Missouri rule.160 
																																																																																																																												
 157 The practice in Ontario differed.  In Toronto, the person in charge of the deposition 
(the “examiner” even though counsel actually questioned the witness) “[would] enter[] 
into the discussion with the lawyers as to the propriety of the question and aids a 
decision.”  Id. at 100.  The examiner in Toronto “exercise[d] limited powers” including 
the power to order a witness to answer and the power to relieve the witness from 
answering.  If an examinant refused to answer a question, the examiner could not compel 
an answer, but the court could compel an answer upon a motion by the proponent of the 
question.  Id. 
 158 Id. at 99. 
 159 RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 97. 
 160 See Draft Rule 32(b) and Note, in PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 104, at 60–61 
(alluding to the Missouri rule providing for a special commissioner).  For the text of the 
rule and notes, see Appendix A. 
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V. SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ABUSES OF THE RIGHT TO ORAL 
EXAMINATION FOR DISCOVERY: THE PROPOSED MASTER-SUPERVISED 
DEPOSITION 
A. The Committee’s Anticipation of Demand for Protection Against 
Overreaching Discovery 
In 1936 the Advisory Committee affirmed that the deposition-
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules permitted an “unlimited right 
of discovery.”161   Despite Sunderland and Clark’s strong support for 
expanding discovery, some of the members of the Advisory Committee 
anticipated a backlash against a liberal right to discovery unless the 
Committee provided better safeguards.  At the Committee’s meeting on 
February 22, 1936, Mitchell, the chairman of the Committee, stated: 
“[W]e are going to have an outburst against this discovery business 
unless we can hedge it about with some appearance of safety against 
fishing expeditions.”162  At the same meeting, Robert Dodge, the Boston 
lawyer, also expressed an awareness of widespread opposition to 
liberalizing discovery, suggesting that the Committee “cloak” the 
discovery provisions in such a way as to make them more acceptable to 
the public.163  Dodge paraphrased a conversation he had had with two 
district court judges who were anxious about an unrestricted discovery 
system.  The judges, according to Dodge, had told him: “[we] hope, for 
heaven’s sake, you are not going to open up this discovery before 
trial.”164 
																																																																																																																												
 161 Note to Draft Rule 32(b) (1936), in PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 104, at 61. 
 162 Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 735, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95.  
When Mitchell presented the new proposed Rules to the A.B.A., he emphasized, perhaps 
disingenuously, the Committee’s avowed interest in protecting against discovery abuses: 
Rules on this subject [discovery] should be carefully drawn to guard against 
abuse.  On the other hand, they should be sufficiently liberal to accomplish 
the intended purpose.  We ask particularly for careful consideration of the 
proposed rules on this subject.  Will the Committee’s proposals sufficiently 
guard against abuse?  Should the right of examination before trial be limited 
to the parties, or extended to other witnesses?  Any suggestions you may 
make based on practical experience will be gratefully received. 
Mitchell, supra note 132, at 782. 
 163 Dodge remarked: “[I]t must be understood that we have to cloak [the prospective 
discovery practice] in such a way as to make it popular in those parts of the country 
where they are totally unfamiliar with it.”  Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 731, CLARK 
PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95. 
 164 Id. at 730–31.  Olney, too, urged that “it should be apparent on the face of the rules 
that there are safeguards, so that they [the rules] will appeal to the members of the 
profession who are not acquainted with this [discovery] practice.”  Id. at 755. 
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The Committee members expressed concerns about the effect of 
expanded discovery on public support for the Rules, and about the 
potential abuse of discovery devices.165 
B. Proposal for a Master-Supervised Deposition 
1. The Committee’s Deliberations 
Concerned that discovery tools would be abused by lawyers, 
George Wickersham, the vice-chairman of the Advisory Committee until 
his death in 1936, announced in November 1935 that he would propose 
that the Rules require that depositions be taken “in the presence of some 
judge or officer having the power to rule on evidence.”166  Mitchell also 
supported such a proposal; he believed that “having a master on demand” 
might “prevent objections from the bar as to fishing expeditions among 
parties.”167 
The first preliminary draft of the Rules, proposed in October 1935, 
did not contain a provision for the appointment of a master to supervise a 
deposition.168  In November, the Committee directed Sunderland to draft 
a rule that provided for the appointment of a master with the power to 
rule on admissibility.169  Sunderland included the provision in what was 
at the time draft Rule 30(c). 170   Under the text Sunderland drafted, 
however, the option of having a master appointed would have been 
available only if the party requesting the appointment could 
“show . . . special and unusual circumstances sufficient to satisfy the 
court that the deposition cannot be satisfactorily taken” before the default 
officer who would take down testimony at the deposition.171  In his Note 
to draft Rule 30(c)172 Sunderland indicated that he was not enthusiastic 
about Wickersham’s proposal.  Sunderland emphasized in his Note that, 
aside from the Wisconsin and Missouri practices that Ragland had 
																																																																																																																												
 165 See infra Part V.B.2. 
 166 Proceedings of Advisory Committee on Uniform Rules of Civil Procedure for the 
District Court of the United States at 252 (Nov. 4, 1935), in CLARK PAPERS, supra note 
100, box 94. 
 167 Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 727, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95. 
 168 Preliminary Draft I (Oct. 15, 16, 25, 1935), CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 
97. 
 169 Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 750, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95. 
 170 See Draft Rule 30(c) (Jan. 13, 1936), in TENTATIVE DRAFT II, infra, Appendix A. 
 171 Id. 
 172 See Note to Draft Rule 30(c), TENTATIVE DRAFT II, infra, Appendix A. 
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documented,173 there was no precedent for appointing an officer with the 
power to decide objections. 
On February 22, 1936, the Committee deliberated about whether 
the Rules should permit an examinant to request that a master with the 
power to rule on the admissibility of evidence preside at the examination.  
Sunderland, Mitchell, and the Harvard Law professor Edmund Morgan174 
confirmed at the meeting that, absent the appointment of a master, the 
Rules contemplated that the officer in charge of the deposition played the 
same role as the “examiner” in federal equity practice.  The officer’s 
primary responsibility was to record testimony.175 
In order to placate both those on the Committee who favored 
unencumbered discovery and those members of the bar who might be 
apprehensive of fishing expeditions, Mitchell proposed that Rule 30(c) 
should only apply when the deponent was an adverse party.176  Monte 
Lemann, the New Orleans lawyer on the Advisory Committee, objected 
that this restriction would not allay fears of the potential for abusive 
discovery.177  Mitchell then proposed, and Lemann agreed, to “leave it 
discretionary with the court in other cases.”178 
																																																																																																																												
 173 See supra Part IV.D.3. 
 174 See supra note 92,. 
 175 In response to a worry about the effect of an adversary paying for the officer’s 
services, Sunderland stated: “as a matter of fact, very little harm will be done, anyway, 
because these examiners have no power.”  Mitchell responded: “Yes; but they have to 
transcribe, certify, and return the deposition” and Morgan agreed: “They have the power 
of reducing the thing to writing, and methodizing, so-called, the deposition.”  
Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 726-27, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95. 
 176 Mitchell’s comment again underscored his motivation for providing safeguards to 
the discovery rules: 
Might we say that it would be sufficient protection if we require a master to 
rule on questions only in those cases where the witness to be examined is an 
adverse party? I thought perhaps if he were just an ordinary witness he 
could protect himself fully by refusing to testify and standing on his rights.  
I think, probably, so long as we are putting this in just to quiet 
apprehensions of lawyers, that it would be sufficient if it were limited to a 
case where you started to examine an adverse party – and by “adverse 
party” I mean directors, officers, and agents of a corporation or association, 
and so forth – 
Id. at 728 (emphasis added). 
 177 Id.  (“If you are really worried about that, as Mr. Wickersham was, I think, very 
much, I am not sure that your limitations would relieve that fear or allay it . . . [because] 
you may get a fishing expedition by going around to a bank, or a third person, not my 
employee, and asking a lot of questions that ought not to be asked.”) Like Mitchell, 
Lemann distinguished anxieties about the public reception of the proposed discovery 
practice from his own worries.  See id. at 728–29 (“I am not subscribing particularly to 
that fear [of fishing expeditions], but I am making the point that if the fear is entertained, 
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Following the exchange between Mitchell and Lemann, Sunderland 
and Morgan made the case against the proposal to allow for a master to 
rule on the admissibility of evidence at the examination.  Sunderland 
opined that the proposal was unworkable179 and stressed that authorizing 
an officer in charge of a deposition to rule on the admissibility of 
testimony was both “contrary to the universal practice”180 and would be 
regressive, restricting the scope of discovery.181  Mitchell was skeptical 
that the novelty of a rule allowing for a master required the Committee to 
reject the proposal.182 
Sunderland’s claim regarding the lack of precedent for Rule 30(c) 
was somewhat strained.  Although he was correct that the Federal Equity 
Rules required the officer in charge of an examination to report all 
testimony notwithstanding objections, 183  those rules applied to 
depositions on oral or written interrogatories for the purpose of 
preserving potential testimony.  If the officer in charge did not record 
objectionable testimony, then the court would have no means of deciding 
whether to suppress that testimony.  The Advisory Committee was 
combining both the preservation of potential testimony and the 
investigation of potential evidence functions in the deposition procedure.  
The Committee made the affirmative decision to allow rules that 
governed the evidence-gathering function – the requirement of 
preserving objectionable testimony – also to govern the discovery 
function. 
																																																																																																																												
and you want to avoid it or protect against it, . . . [Rule 30(b) would not] leave it 
sufficiently protected.”) 
 178 Id. at 728. 
 179 Id. at 729. (“As a matter of fact, I do not see how this thing will work anyway.”). 
 180 Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 729, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95. (“I 
do not find any authority for these examiners or masters ruling on testimony.  The equity 
rule expressly provides that all evidence taken before an examiner or like officer, together 
with any objections, shall be saved and returned into court.”).  Sunderland, however, did 
know about the Wisconsin and Missouri practices that Ragland described in Discovery 
Before Trial. 
 181 Id. at 729–30.  In response to Morgan’s comment “I think it would be very 
unfortunate to let a master rule on evidence,” Sunderland said: “if we put in a thing like 
this, we would be going backward” and “[i]t would be a serious regression on our part.”  
Id. 
 182 See Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 731, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95 
(Mitchell exclaiming to Morgan: “It may not have been the practice normally to give a 
master the power to rule on evidence, unless he is going to make findings of fact, but 
there is no reason on God’s earth why we cannot have a rule [that does give the master 
the power to rule on evidence].”). 
 183 See supra Part III.E.. 
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In response to Sunderland’s and Morgan’s criticisms, Mitchell 
began to reconsider his support for Wickersham’s initial proposal: “I am 
inclined to think that my suggestion, which was made to quiet the fears 
of General Wickersham and others, is probably not a sound one.”184  
Mitchell’s comment spurred more debate.185 
Monte Lemann suggested that the Committee adopt the New York 
rule, in which an objection to a question asked during an examination 
could be referred immediately to the judge. 186   Sunderland rejected 
Lemann’s suggestion on the grounds that “running to the judge” would 
be “a great nuisance to the courts” and would “not work at all in sparsely 
settled circuits.”187  Mitchell agreed, pointing out that the judges “might 
be trying cases, and they would have to stop.  They could not do that.”188  
Sunderland also referred to the Wisconsin practice, in which it was said 
that judges did not like being asked to rule on discovery disputes and 
instead made the examinant “answer, so [the lawyers] do not go to [the 
judges] much.”189 
Sunderland sought to break the impasse by suggesting a cosmetic 
rule: “Why can we not put in a provision for a master on application, just 
to look well, but not put anything about giving the master power to 
exclude evidence?” 190   Both Lemann and Mitchell thought that 
Sunderland’s idea was unhelpful.  Lemann said that because 
Sunderland’s “high-class man” to supervise the deposition191 would only 
be able to “sit there and look pleasant,” “you might as well have a low-
class man.”192 
George Wharton Pepper, a former Senator from Pennsylvania who 
joined the Committee after Wickersham died in 1936,193 weighed in and 
																																																																																																																												
 184 Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 730, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95. 
 185 See id. at 730–62. 
 186 According to Lemann: “If the master says, ‘I think this testimony ought not to go 
in,’ the fellow who wants it to go in would say, ‘Let us go right down to the judge now 
and let him rule on it.’  I understand that is what they do in New York.”  Id. at 733–34. 
 187 Id. at 734. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id.; see also RAGLAND, supra note 81, at 104–06 (describing Wisconsin judges’ 
aversion to adjudicating disputes arising out of depositions). 
 190 Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 735, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95.  
Sunderland believed that the question of the master’s power to exclude evidence was 
“really the difficult part.”  Id. 
 191 See id. (Sunderland suggesting that a “high-class man” could preside over the 
deposition). 
 192 Id. 
 193 Order, 297 U.S. 731 (1936). 
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condemned the broad right to conduct a deposition.194  Pepper worried 
that a plaintiff might bring a pretextual suit in order to use the Rules to 
publicly embarrass the defendant. 195    When Mitchell facetiously 
wondered aloud whether Pepper’s fears about public embarrassment 
stemmed from Pepper’s time serving on Senatorial committees,196 Pepper 
replied “exactly; and that is where I got a taste of the kind of lawlessness 
that ruins people’s reputations without the opportunity ever to redress the 
harm that is done.”197  In addition to his vehement opposition to a nearly 
unlimited right to take a deposition, 198  Pepper also criticized the 
motivation behind the Committee’s attempt to make the discovery rules 
acceptable to the public.199  Pepper predicted that the Supreme Court 
would never approve of the expanded right to discovery that the 
Committee was then inclined to propose.200 
																																																																																																																												
 194 See Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 735-37, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 
95 
 195 Pepper said: 
[I]n the part of the country I come from, I know perfectly well that this sort 
of power given to a plaintiff is simply going to be used as a means of 
ruining the reputation of responsible people.  You bring a suit against a man, 
without any ground whatever—the president of some important company, 
the president of a utilities company or a bank or something.  You take his 
deposition, have the reporters present, and grill him in the most unfair way, 
intimating that he is a burglar or murderer, or this, that, and the other.  He 
has no redress, and the next morning the papers have a whole lot of front-
page stuff.  The case never goes any further.  That is all that was intended. 
Id. at 735-36. 
 196 “It is too much like some of these Senate committees you used to sit on. 
[Laughter].”  Id. at 736. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Pepper also remarked: 
[T]here is anything worse than the use of judicial proceedings for the 
creation of a forum from which, through the newspapers, to harangue the 
public.  The defendant is perfectly helpless.  There is no restraint upon the 
examination.  This business of getting a high-class man to sit there and 
listen in [referring to the possibility of using masters to superintend 
depositions] increases the audience for the publication of the slander, but 
that is all it does. 
Id. 
 199 Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 736, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95. (“I 
do not like the attitude of mind that suggests that the thing to do is to make a vicious 
practice sound well or look well.”). 
 200 Id. (“It seems to me that the whole thing [broad right to taking depositions] is 
vicious, and the only reason I am not worried more about it is that I am morally certain 
that it will never get by the Supreme Court, I do not care how you dress it up.”). 
2013] The Origins of the Oral Deposition in the Federal Rules 79 
	
Robert Dodge, the Boston lawyer, shifted the topic of discussion to 
the courts’ control over the discovery process. 201   Mitchell, still 
concerned over the bar’s attitude toward the tentative Rules,202 suggested 
that a party should be required to get the court’s permission before taking 
a deposition.203  Morgan countered that the Committee should permit a 
party to take a deposition as the default rule, but “allow the party who 
has been served with the notice, for good cause shown, to prohibit the 
taking of the deposition by the adverse party.”204  Lemann replied that 
the judge would not have a basis for deciding whether a litigant would be 
asking “a lot of improper questions.”205  Mitchell, with the support of 
Pepper, then proposed another form of prior restraint on the taking of 
depositions, that the judge should be able to specify “the particular things 
you are going to be allowed to inquire about” by making “an order 
defining the things you can fish about.”206  Sunderland objected because 
in New York such orders had led to “an enormous amount of preliminary 
litigation, which becomes quite a nuisance.”207 
Warren Olney, the San Francisco lawyer, was of the view that the 
Committee should not design the rules around the less scrupulous 
members of the bar.  Drawing on his experience in California, Olney 
asserted that the Committee was exaggerating the potential for abuse of 
the discovery rules.208  Olney suggested that, instead of the option of 
																																																																																																																												
 201 Id. at 736–37.  (“In some ways the courts must have control over the proceedings, 
and the power to check abuses.  I that is more important than any question of references 
to a master.”).  Dodge went on to discuss the risks of strikesuits and “nuisance 
settlements.”  Id. at 737. 
 202 Id. at 739 (“I think the bar would like it better if you were required to get your 
authority [to take a deposition] from the court in advance.”) (emphasis added)). 
 203 See id. at 737. 
 204 Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 737, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95. 
 205 Id. at 738. 
 206 Id. at 740. 
 207 Id.  Pepper also perceived difficulties in circumscribing the scope of the 
examination.  He approved of the proposal for the optional appointment of a master, but 
he stated: “I do not know by what yardstick the master will measure the relevancy of 
questions put, because, by the terms of the proposition, no issue has been framed, and it is 
as wide-open as the sky.”  Id. at 752-53; See also text accompanying notes 128–130, 
supra.  Pepper doubted the feasibility of restricting the scope of the examination to those 
matters relevant to the pleadings because “the complaint may be full of matter which, 
upon motion, will be stricken out as scandalous and impertinent, but this deposition will 
take place before there is ever a chance to make such a motion as that.”  Proceedings of 
Feb. 22, 1936 at 753, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95. 
 208 Id. at 742.  (“[In California] [t]here is the very freest right out there to take the 
deposition of an adverse party, and has been ever since I can remember.  It is not abused 
in the way in which it has been described here that there is fear that it might be.”).  
Furthermore, Olney remarked that even though there were “members of the bar” who had 
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requesting the appointment of a master, a party should have the right to 
apply to the court to terminate the deposition if the procedure was being 
used for an improper purpose, such as harassment.209 
At the end of the debate over Sunderland’s draft of tentative Rule 
30(c), the Committee voted to instruct Sunderland to revise the rule in 
two respects.  First, the option of having a master with the power to rule 
on the admissibility of evidence would be available only in the case of a 
deposition of an adverse party.  Second, in the case of a deposition at 
which a master did not preside, a party that alleged abuse would be able 
to apply to the court to “correct the situation” and to have the right to 
take a deposition “checked or limited.”210 
In May 1936 the Advisory Committee distributed the Preliminary 
Draft of the Rules 211  “to the Bench and Bar for criticism and 
suggestions.”212  Sunderland’s revised version of the proposal to provide 
for a master to supervise a deposition – Rule 30(c) in the Committee’s 
Tentative Draft II213 – appeared as Rule 32(b) in the publicly circulated 
Preliminary Draft.214 
2. Private and Public Criticism of the Liberal Right to Discovery in 
the Rules 
The Committee received correspondence from lawyers and 
associations of lawyers in response to the Preliminary Draft.  The Clark 
Papers include two bound volumes of these suggestions, dating from the 
period between June and December 1936.215 
																																																																																																																												
“no scruples in the world, and they live very largely, to be plain, by blackmail,” lawyers 
in California “have not had this particular trouble.”  Id. at 744. 
 209 Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 756, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95.  A 
version of Olney’s suggestion would become FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d) (1938).  See Appendix 
A, infra. 
 210 Proceedings of Feb. 22, 1936 at 760-62, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 95. 
 211 PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 104, at iv. 
 212 Id. at iv. 
 213 See infra Appendix A. 
 214 See id. at 60–61 (reprinted at Appendix A, infra). 
 215 See 13 Preparatory Papers, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 101 
(“Suggestions on the Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure: Received from Local 
Committees, District Court Committees, Circuit and District Judges, Members of the Bar, 
and others.  June-December 1936.  A – G”); 14 Preparatory Papers, CLARK PAPERS, 
supra note 100, box 102 (“Suggestions on the Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil 
Procedure: Received from Local Committees, District Court Committees, Circuit and 
District Judges, Members of the Bar, and others.  June-December 1936.  H – Z”).  I cite 
the page numbers of the correspondence therein because the volumes themselves are not 
consecutively paginated. 
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The majority of the comments regarding the discovery rules were 
negative.  Most writers focused on the then Rule 31, entitled 
“Depositions; Their Form; Purposes; Scope; Use and Effect; Costs”.  The 
writers feared “fishing expeditions”216 in which litigants would be able to 
annoy adversaries217 and might be tempted to concoct false evidence.218  
One commentator speculated that adopting the Rules would increase the 
																																																																																																																												
 216 See, e.g., Letter from E. J. Marshall of Marshall, Melhorn and Marlar, Toledo, 
Ohio (July 31, 1936) at 1 in 14 Preparatory Papers, supra note 214 (“Your Committee 
understands ‘discovery’ to include fishing expeditions.”).  Marshall was vehement in his 
objections: 
You [William D. Mitchell] and perhaps I might be decent and reasonable in 
the taking of depositions but keep in mind that you are setting up a 
procedure to be used by every crook and shyster who has a license to 
practice law and you dare not assume that they will be decent . . . . 
I can see that one, such as my good friend Sunderland, who has 
spent his life in the cloister, reading and teaching the Canons of 
Ethics might honestly believe that the proposed procedure would 
not be abused if put into the hands of everyday working lawyers, 
but I have seen it in actual operation and know what will happen.  
I am not guessing.  I am not reading the answer in the stars . . . . 
I insist that the court must have the full, unfettered control and 
regulation of all proceedings from the beginning to the end and 
your draft of rules should so provide in words of one syllable that 
no one can misunderstand. 
Id. at 2–3. 
 217 See, e.g., Letter from the Committee of the Bar of the Southern District of 
Alabama (Aug. 14, 1936) at 6, in 13 Preparatory Papers, supra note 214 (the rule 
permitting unlimited discovery (Rule 31 in PRELIMINARY DRAFT, see Appendix A) 
“seems to us to be highly vexatious in this particular and in all likelihood would result in 
every case in a preliminary fishing expedition and then a trial”).  The State Bar of 
California advocated for the elimination of Rule 31(c): 
We do not believe that a party to an action should have the right to go on a 
fishing expedition and call in as witnesses in a deposition any person who 
he may think can shed any light on the subject and thereby discommode 
persons not interested in the particular litigation. . . . .  The fishing permitted 
is on entirely too great a body of water. 
State Bar of California Committee Report (Aug. 10, 1936) at 1, 2, in 13 Preparatory 
Papers, supra note 214. 
 218 See, e.g., Letter from John H. Cantrell of Spielman, Cantrell & McCloud, 
Oklahoma City (July 23, 1936) at 2, in 13 Preparatory Papers, supra note 214 (“To 
make it too easy to engage in ‘fishing expeditions’ creates the temptation upon the part of 
an over-zealous advocate to fabricate evidence to contravene and destroy the evidence of 
the opponent”). 
82 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 10:43 
	
likelihood of suits intended to prepare for larger lawsuits. 219   Even 
commentators who were avowed supporters of expanded discovery 
believed that the Advisory Committee’s preliminary draft permitted 
overly expansive discovery.220 
A group of insurance executives provided a comprehensive critique 
of the discovery rules.221  They reasoned that by permitting depositions 
of both parties and non-parties, and by permitting depositions to be taken 
for the dual purposes of discovery and for use as evidence (or both), the 
proposed rules would result in “obvious fishing expedition expeditions” 
and promote “other evils.”222 
The Association did not believe that the protections offered by Rule 
32(b) were adequate.  The Association recommended, instead, that 
inquiry should be limited to any matter that was “material and necessary” 
to the pending action, rather than merely “relevant.”223  The Association 
further suggested that the appointment of a master, which was an option 
																																																																																																																												
 219 Comments by New York Court of Appeals Judge Edward R. Finch at ABA 
Meeting in Boston (Aug. 28, 1936) at 1, in 13 Preparatory Papers, supra note 214 (“A 
person asserting a claim should not be given all the advantages here proposed unless at 
the same time the rights of defendants are adequately safeguarded.”); Id. at 3 (noting that 
strikesuits to prepare for a larger law suit “will be greatly encouraged by the adoption of 
the preliminary draft”).  Finch believed that the expanded discovery devices under the 
Rules would harm both plaintiffs and defendants.  Unless the federal courts adopted a 
loser-pays system, defendants would be forced to pay for the settlement of “so-called 
speculative litigation” because it would be cheaper than resisting, and a poor plaintiff 
would be forced by a wealthy defendant “to accept an unfair settlement [for a meritorious 
claim]” because of the great expense of discovery.  Edward R. Finch, Some Fundamental 
and Practical Objections to the Preliminary Draft of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the 
District Courts of the United States, 22 A.B.A. J. 809, 810–11 (1936). 
 220 See, e.g., Letter from Charles A. Beardsley of Fitzgerald, Abbot & Beardsley, 
Oakland, CA (June 19, 1936) at 2, in 13 Preparatory Papers, supra note 214.  
(“Personally I am a firm believer in the liberalization of the rules of evidence, but it 
seems to me that these provisions [Rule 31] are entirely too liberal.”) 
 221 Letter from Association of Casualty and Surety Executives (received by the 
Advisory Committee on Oct. 8, 1936) at 1–3, in 13 Preparatory Papers, supra note 214. 
 222 Id. at 1.  The “evils” included: perpetuating “blackmail and extortion”; facilitating 
“strike suits for the purpose of unearthing evidence to form the basis of large lawsuits”; 
incentivizing plaintiff’s lawyers “to ‘find’ witnesses to offset the testimony given by 
defendants’ known witnesses”; allowing plaintiffs to obtain, without cost to themselves, 
records of companies that “may have been acquired by the defendant at great expense”; 
threatening to waste executives’ time in order to “demand and possibly obtain much 
higher amounts in settlement than is now the case”; and the risk of champerty because 
“an unscrupulous attorney for a nominal plaintiff could use this device to obtain the 
names and addresses of possible serious cases and thus contact those persons, in which 
event the procedure would . . . stimulate litigation instead of reducing it.”  The 
Association claimed that the rules overly disfavored the defendant because the plaintiff 
might have no records and could claim not to know of any witnesses.  Id. at 1–2. 
 223 Id. at 2. 
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under Rule 32(b) only if the court granted a party’s request for such an 
appointment, should be a mandatory feature of deposition practice.224 
Still other commentators recommended revisions to Rule 32(b).  
One commentator objected to the Rule 32(b) master’s power entirely to 
exclude evidence.  Tenth Circuit Judge George T. McDermott wrote that 
the master should preserve the substance of inadmissible testimony, 
unless it was privileged.225  The Federal Bar Association of New York, 
New Jersey, and Connecticut suggested that the Committee should call 
the person authorized to hold the examination under Rule 32(b) a 
“commissioner” because a “master reports findings and makes 
recommendations.”226  A lawyer from Ohio, E. J. Marshall, suggested 
that the court should have the power to issue protective orders or 
terminate a deposition taken in bad faith.227  His arguments were similar 
to those that Olney had made at the Committee’s February 1936 
meeting.228 
The compilation229 of all the comments that the Committee received 
on the May 1936 Preliminary Draft included only one comment that 
advocated eliminating Rule 32(b) entirely.230 
According to Edward Hammond, a member of the Committee’s 
staff,231 some lawyers worried about who would pay the master’s fee 
whereas others expressed concerns about the master’s authority to 
																																																																																																																												
 224 See id. at 3 (proposing that all examinations “should be made before a competent 
and responsible officer, or provision should be made for the determination of objections 
by a Judge or properly qualified Referee or Master.”). 
 225 See Letter from George T. McDermott (Sept. 9, 1936) at 3, in 14 Preparatory 
Papers, supra note 214 (“In hearings before masters, I think the substance of Equity Rule 
46 should be preserved to the effect that where evidence is offered and excluded, the 
court shall preserve the substance thereof, except where the evidence is excluded on the 
ground of a privileged communication.”). 
 226 Federal Bar Ass’n of N.Y., N.J. & Conn. Committee Report (Aug. 25, 1936) at 14, 
in 13 Preparatory Papers, supra note 214. 
 227 Letter from E. J. Marshall of Marshall, Melhorn and Marlar, Toledo, Ohio (July 
31, 1936) at 1 in 14 Preparatory Papers, supra note 214 (urging that the Committee 
“provide very definitely that the court may make any sort of an order and give any 
directions that appear to be proper to regulate and control the taking of the depositions, 
and to see that they are fairly taken, or to order that the depositions be not taken.”). 
 228 See supra text accompanying note 208. 
 229 See 16 Preparatory Papers, in CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 103 
(“Abstracts, Oct. 1935-Jan. 1937”) (including comments and objections to the proposed 
Rules). 
 230 Letter from Russell Wiles (June 19, 1936), in 16 Preparatory Papers, supra note 
228.  Wiles, a Chicago lawyer, recommended that the Committee eliminate draft Rule 
32(b) because allowing a master to exclude evidence at the discovery stage would be 
disruptive to the litigation. 
 231 Report of the Advisory Committee, in PROPOSED RULES, supra note 105, at vii. 
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restrict the freedom of discovery.232  In fact, not all the reactions to Rule 
32(b) were negative.  At an ABA meeting on August 26, 1936, a New 
York lawyer, Martin Conboy, lamented that “the proposed rule 31 goes 
the full distance in permitting unlimited discovery before trial.”233  In 
order to mitigate such broad right to discovery, Conboy urged that “an 
oral examination by counsel” should “require the right to judicial 
determination of the propriety of any question before answer, particularly 
upon the examination of an adverse party.”234  Conboy recommended 
that the judge should play a more active role in controlling the deposition 
either directly or by means of a master.235 
C. The Committee’s Ultimate Rejection of the Proposal to Provide for a 
Master-Supervised Deposition 
On October 25, 1936, the Committee voted to strike Rule 32(b) 
from the draft Rules.236  Instead of allowing a party to request that a 
judge or master preside over a deposition, the Committee decided to 
grant the judge two means of supervisory control.  First, the drafters 
empowered the court to issue a protective order “upon motion seasonably 
made by any party or by any person to be examined and upon notice and 
for good cause shown.”237  Second, the court in which the case was 
																																																																																																																												
 232 Edward H. Hammond, Some Changes in the Preliminary Draft of the Proposed 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 629, 632 (1937).  (“There was 
considerable objection by the profession to the master rule, particularly to the provision 
giving the power to rule on evidence and it was thought that the power to exclude 
evidence might be so exercised as to hamper the desired freedom of discovery.  The 
matter of costs in the way of master’s fees and expenses might also act as a deterrent to 
the use of discovery and would give an unfair advantage to those more able to pay 
them.”); see also Brazil, supra note 75, at 168 (noting that the papers preserved in the 
Clark Papers do not detail the objections to which Hammond referred nor the 
Committee’s consideration of them). 
 233 See Martin Conboy, Depositions, Discovery and Summary Judgments: As Dealt 
with in Title V of the Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal Courts, 22 
A.B.A. J. 881, 883 (1936). 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. at 883–84. (“The rules contain no provision for the exclusion of objectionable 
questions before answer, if asked in good faith and in the absence of a master . . . .  If 
resort to the Federal judges is permitted, perhaps they can prevent abuse of the privilege 
[to discovery] by either the interrogator or the objector.  Perhaps the judge should have 
the power to appoint a master on his own motion, if either objector or interrogator should 
be unduly aggressive.  Power might even be conferred upon the judge to decide who 
should advance the expense of the master in such cases.”). 
 236 Proceedings of the Advisory Committee (October 25, 1936) at 2, in CLARK 
PAPERS, supra note 100, box 96 (notation next to Rule 32(b) (“Depositions Before a 
Master”) stating: “It was agreed that 32(b) be stricken out.”). 
 237 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b) (1938) (amended 1993), infra, Appendix A. 
2013] The Origins of the Oral Deposition in the Federal Rules 85 
	
pending was permitted, in addition to a number of enumerated options, 
“to make any other order which justice requires to protect the party or 
witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.”238 
A further means of regulating the deposition was a provision that 
“at any time during the taking of the deposition . . . any party or the 
deponent” could make a motion to the court for an order to terminate the 
taking of the deposition, or to issue a protective order limiting the “scope 
and manner of the taking of the deposition.”239  In order to prevail in 
seeking such an order, the movant would have to show “that the 
examination is being conducted in bad faith, or in such manner as 
unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party.”240 
The Rules did not provide for an officer with authority to apply the 
rules of evidence during the course of the deposition.  With the exception 
of evidentiary privileges, the rules of evidence did not limit what an 
adversary could discover.  The rules of evidence would still regulate 
what testimony could be admitted at trial.241 
As part of his public-relations effort to the Bar, Mitchell reported in 
the American Bar Association Journal that the protections available 
under Rules 30(b) and (d) were superior to those that would have been 
available under Rule 32(b). 242   In the same journal, Hammond, the 
																																																																																																																												
 238 Id.  Excessive cost was not a basis for seeking a protective order.  See Tactical Use 
and Abuse of Depositions Under the Federal Rules, 59 YALE L.J. 117, 138 (1949) 
(recommending the inclusion of “expense” as a basis for protective orders under Rules 
30(b) and (d)). 
 239 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d) (1938) (amended 2000), infra, Appendix A. 
 240 Id.  Perhaps to discourage frivolous motions for orders to terminate depositions, 
the Rule also provided: “In granting or refusing such order the court may impose upon 
either party or upon the witness the requirement to pay such costs or expenses as the 
court may deem reasonable.”  Id. 
 241 The Committee decided that, instead of providing for an officer who could 
contemporaneously control the deposition, the judge would, at the request of parties, 
supervise the discovery process.  For one federal judge’s description of the judicial role 
under the Rules’ discovery provisions, see Irving R. Kaufman, The Philosophy of 
Effective Judicial Supervision Over Litigation, 29 F.R.D. 207, 213 (1962).  For a later 
assessment of the effectiveness of judicial control over discovery, see Wayne D. Brazil, 
Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial Development of Civil Actions: Model Rules 
for Case Management and Sanctions 6 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 873 (1981). 
 242 William D. Mitchell, Some of the Problems Confronting the Advisory Committee 
in Recent Months—Commencement of Actions—Effect of Findings of Fact in Cases Tried 
by Court Instead of Jury, Etc., 23 A.B.A. J 966, 969 (1937). (“We [the Advisory 
Committee] have stricken out the provision that allowed the party to be examined to 
demand the appointment of a master to supervise the examination.  On the other hand, we 
have fortified the provisions for protection against improper examinations and fishing 
expeditions. There are now adequate provisions allowing a party or a witness to apply to 
the court to limit the scope of the examination or to terminate it entirely if the privilege is 
being abused.”) 
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Committee staff member, also emphasized that, despite the elimination 
of Rule 32(b), more than adequate protections against abusive discovery 
remained in the Rules, from the court itself.243 
The cost of engaging a master played a significant role in the 
Committee’s ultimate rejection of draft Rule 32(b).  In addition to 
Hammond’s reference in 1937 to such concerns on the part of the bar,244 
Mitchell was aware that masters’ costs would affect the feasibility of a 
discovery system that employed them.  In November 1935, Wickersham 
and Dodge both supported the possibility of importing the English 
“Summons for Direction” 245  – the English equivalent of a pretrial 
conference under Rule 16 – into American pretrial practice. 246   In 
response, Mitchell cautioned that Congress would not be willing to 
appropriate funds to pay for the standing masters that such a procedure 
required.247  In a 1937 article, Mitchell explained that standing masters in 
England were civil servants, paid from state funds. “[I]n the United 
States the district courts have standing masters, but their compensation is 
not paid out of the public treasury, and if their services are used their 
compensation must be paid by litigants and it would be out of line with 
American ideas to compel the litigants to pay the compensation of a 
master conducting pre-trial proceedings.”248 
The Advisory Committee did not propose what would have perhaps 
been a more effective means of deterring strike suits and preventing 
abusive discovery practices: a loser-pays system.  At a 1937 American 
Bar Association meeting, Mitchell described New York Court of Appeals 
Judge Edward Finch’s endorsement of such an approach at the ABA’s 
																																																																																																																												
 243 Hammond, supra note 231, at 631 (noting that the protection afforded to parties in 
the Preliminary Draft “of having the taking of the deposition stopped if it is not being 
conducted in good faith or is being conducted for the purpose of annoying, embarrassing 
or oppressing a party, has been retained, in improved form, (Old Rule 32(c)) and that 
protection has been extended to witnesses. (Rule 30(d))”); see also id. at 632 (“It is 
thought that the provisions for the protection of parties and witnesses just mentioned will 
afford at least as much protection as was intended to be afforded by the master under the 
old rule.  Furthermore, that protection will now come directly from the court itself.”). 
 244 See supra note 231. 
 245 See supra, note 112 and accompanying text. 
 246 Proceedings of the Advisory Committee (Nov. 4, 1935) at 252, in CLARK PAPERS, 
supra note 100, box 94. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Mitchell, supra note 241, at 970.  Mitchell reiterated: “[N]o rule can be adopted 
which assumes that Congress will appropriate money to pay masters for such service.”  
Id. See also Brazil, supra note 75, at 171 n. 190 (“[In American practice] we have no 
trained masters”). 
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1936 meeting.249  Mitchell explained that the Advisory Committee had 
declined to make “any substantial change in the present basis for taxing 
costs or disbursements” because any such reform is “a matter for 
Congress and not properly embodied in the proposed rules of practice of 
procedure.”250  Mitchell suggested that “in places like New York City,” 
“where the conditions are admittedly bad and many dishonest actions are 
brought in the courts, the rules relating to discovery and examination 
before trial offer opportunities to lawyers of low ethical standards,” the 
“remedy is an improvement in the machinery for disbarring or 
disciplining lawyers guilty of misconduct.”251  Given the Committee’s 
constraints, Mitchell believed that improving the self-regulatory regime 
of the legal profession was a better way to prevent abuse of the discovery 
system than a loser-pays system. 
D. Congressional Testimony Regarding the Relationship Between Jury 
Trial and the Discovery Provisions in the Final Draft of the Rules 
In 1938 both the House and the Senate Committees on the Judiciary 
held hearings on the new Federal Rules.252  Under the Enabling Act, the 
Rules would come into force unless the Congress took “affirmative 
advance action.”253 
																																																																																																																												
 249 See supra note 218; Mitchell, supra note 241, at 969 (reporting that Judge Finch’s 
“principal suggestion was that the law should punish the plaintiff who brings a strike suit 
by requiring him to pay not merely the ordinary costs, but all the expenses of the 
defendant, including reasonable counsel fees, if the defense is successful.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 250 Mitchell, supra note 241, at 969. 
 251 Id. 
 252 See Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts: Hearings 
Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 75th Cong., 3rd 
Sess., on S.J. Res. 281, A Joint Resolution To Postpone the Effective Date of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, Part 2, 75th Cong. 29 (1938) 
[hereinafter Senate Hearings]; Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the 
United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 
75th Cong., 3d Sess., with Regard to The “Rules of Civil Procedure for the District 
Courts of the United States,” Adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States 
Pursuant to the Act of June 19, 1934 (48 Stat. 1064) and on H.R. 8892, 75th Cong 1 
(1938) [hereinafter House Hearings] 
 253 House Hearings, supra note 252, at 1 (Statement of Hatton W. Summers, 
Chairman).  In fact, some of the Federal Rules, once enacted, were on at least one 
occasion applied to an action pending before the effective date of the Rules.  See, e.g., 
Columbia Metaloy Company v. Bank of America (N.D. Cal, Nov. 7, 1938) (Rule 26(a), 
permitting taking of depositions without leave of court after answer is filed, applied to 
action pending before effective date of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).  Columbia 
Metaloy was cited in Decisions on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: From Bulletins 
II, III, IV and V Issued by the Department of Justice, 24 A.B.A. J. 984, 986 (1938). 
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At the hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, two D.C. 
lawyers, Challen B. Ellis and Kahl K. Spriggs, testified that the expanded 
discovery regime under the new Federal Rules had radical implications 
for the right to jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.  Ellis noted that, 
overall, the Rules established the private exercise of judicial powers: 
“These [new] rules put power in the hands of the parties which even in 
equity cases are only in the hands of the court.”254  The parties to a suit 
could engage in a lengthy discovery process in which each side could 
deploy any number of discovery devices, with a limited role for the 
judge. 
Spriggs argued that the Rules endangered the existence of the jury 
trial.  Spriggs submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee a 
memorandum entitled “Analysis of Some of the Rules which Particularly 
Affect or Change the Nature of Trial by Jury.”255  In his report, Spriggs 
concluded: 
In general, the various powers of discretion reposed in the court 
under the new rules, together with the power of every litigant to 
try the case piecemeal, serve to whittle down the right of trial by 
jury. Heretofore the theory has been that a case may be submitted 
at one time through the medium of oral testimony and in open 
court, except in the infrequent instances in which depositions are 
used. Now, by a kind of inquisition conducted under rule 26, 
interrogatories under rule 33, discovery under rule 34, and 
admission of facts under rule 36, together with the consequences 
imminent under rule 37, there is left little further to be done.256 
Whereas before the 1938 Rules the right to discovery was a limited right 
to gather information that would help a party prepare its case for trial, 
Spriggs recognized that, under the Rules, the greatly expanded right to 
discovery could eliminate altogether the need for a jury trial.257 
Spriggs may have been correct that the rules he alluded to were 
intended to reduce the frequency of jury trials.  Sunderland, who drafted 
																																																																																																																												
 254 Senate Hearings, supra note 252, at 42. 
 255 Id. at 48. 
 256 83 CONG. REC. 8481 (June 8, 1938) (memorandum regarding the effect of the 
Federal Rules on substantive rights, submitted by Kahl K. Spriggs to Senate Judiciary 
Committee).  Spriggs’s memo was also submitted to the Committee.  See Senate 
Hearings, supra note 252, at 52. 
 257 As Subrin has described, in October 1936, the Patent Section Committee of the 
American Bar Association conveyed their concerns to the Advisory Committee that “the 
new rules would detract from the essential goal of the Equity Rules to have trials in open 
court; [the Patent Section Committee] did not think their concerns were ‘peculiar to the 
practice of patent law.’”  Subrin, supra note 10, at 731. 
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the discovery rules that Spriggs criticized, had in 1925 described the civil 
jury trial as “the most archaic, cumbersome, expensive and inefficient 
means of trying cases that could well be devised.”258  Prior to serving as 
Chief Justice, Charles Evans Hughes had also advocated fewer jury 
trials, suggesting that jury trials be replaced by bench trials, rather than 
by a permissive pretrial discovery regime.259  Notwithstanding criticisms 
of the Rules’ discovery provisions, 260  the Rules came into force on 
September 16, 1938.261 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A striking attribute of the American deposition is that opposing 
counsel conducts the questioning in the absence of a judicial officer.  
Because of the novelty and centrality of the deposition procedure, I have 
looked for the origins of the absence of an officer with authority to rule 
on evidentiary objections.  I have determined that the Advisory 
Committee considered providing such an officer in the Rules, but 
																																																																																																																												
 258 Edson R. Sunderland, Cooperation Between the Bar and the Public in Improving 
the Administration of Justice, 1 Ala. L.J. 5, 8 (1925). “If one should deliberately search 
for a system of trial which would open the widest door to sympathy, prejudice, chance 
and ignorance, I do not know how he could improve on our present jury system.”  Id. 
 259 Do Away With Trial By Jury, Hughes Urges, CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE, Dec. 7, 
1928 at 11. 
 260 Ellis testified: 
Why should the defendant be required to answer under oath plaintiff’s 
claims on penalty of punishment?  Why should this be required of the 
defendant, when the plaintiff is not even required to state his claim on oath?  
Every defendant in a law case is ordinarily permitted to require the plaintiff 
to prove his case, and not be required to prove his case for him.  Why should 
all this be allowed?  The facts thus extorted from the defendant may be 
“relevant,” although inadmissible as evidence and wholly unnecessary. 
Senate Hearing, supra note 252, at 47.  Spriggs testified through his memorandum: “Rule 
26 goes further, it is believed, toward permitting a ‘fishing expedition’ to be indulged in 
concerning matters which may or may not be admissible in evidence than has ever been 
sanctioned by Congress in a jury action.”  Id. at 51. 
 261 LETTER FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE “RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES”, ADOPTED BY THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES PURSUANT TO THE ACT OF JUNE 19, 1934, CH. 
651, in RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
(JANUARY 3, 1938 – REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY AND ORDERED TO BE 
PRINTED) at v); see also 83 CONG. REC. 8473.    Justice Brandeis did not approve of the 
new Federal Rules.  When Chief Justice Hughes transmitted the new Rules to Attorney 
General Cummings on December 20, 1937, Hughes wrote in his covering letter: “I am 
requested to state that Mr. Justice Brandeis does not approve of the adoption of the 
rules.” H.R. DOC. NO. 460 (1938) at v.  Subrin has attributed the ultimate acceptability of 
the Rules at the hearings to the “brilliance of the advocacy before Congress” by Edgar 
Tolman and William Mitchell.  See Subrin, supra note 10, at 740–43. 
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decided in October 1936 that it would be unworkable to provide an 
examinant with the right to request that his examination be supervised by 
a master with the power to rule on the admissibility of evidence.262 
The modern American deposition traces back to evidence-gathering 
methods in equity practice, in which an agent of the court would examine 
a witness by administering party-propounded written interrogatories 
outside the presence of the parties and of counsel.  In mid-nineteenth-
century federal practice, very limited pretrial discovery existed.  After 
1842, the Federal Equity Rules authorized a party to ask questions of an 
adversary, in the presence either of an examiner who merely recorded 
testimony or of a master who played a more collaborative role with the 
party’s counsel.  By the end of the nineteenth century, the examiner 
presided over examinations to gather evidence, but had no power to rule 
on admissibility. 
When the Advisory Committee merged the examination for the 
preservation of potential testimony with the examination for discovery, 
the lack of existing judicial personnel played a major role in the 
Committee’s decision not to provide for an officer to apply the rules of 
evidence at the examination itself.263  If standing masters had continued 
																																																																																																																												
 262 Brazil concludes that federal judges may rely on the judiciary’s “inherent power” 
to appoint pre-trial special masters to handle discovery tasks.  See generally, Brazil, 
supra note 75.  Irving Kaufman, a federal judge, has supported the use of masters to 
preside at the taking of depositions: 
For our purposes, the significance of history lies not in whether the Master 
was in fact conceptually regarded as a judge or clerk.  It is to be found rather 
in the fact that the Master has traditionally been able to dispose of the more 
routine and ministerial duties thereby freeing the judge for the more 
pressing trial work.  Consider, if you will, the most universally accepted 
extra judicial officer now employed in this country-the Referee in 
Bankruptcy.  The Bankruptcy Referee was our response to the burgeoning 
bankruptcy business that deluged the courts in the last century.  It was 
apparent early in our history that to invest exclusive and nondelegable 
jurisdiction over the administration of bankruptcy laws in the courts 
themselves would seriously impede the effective judicial handling of 
equally important matters.  The same practical considerations should govern 
our discussion today. 
Irving R. Kaufman, Use of Masters to Preside at the Taking of Depositions, 22 F.R.D. 
465, 467–68 (1958). 
 263 The establishment of Federal Magistrates in the 1960s could have been an 
opportunity to resurrect the Committee’s draft Rule 32(b).  Magistrates could have 
presided over pretrial depositions.  Under the Magistrates Act, magistrates are appointed 
to office by the district courts.  Section 636(b) of the Act, which is the source of the 
magistrate’s civil authority, empowered the magistrate, when authorized by local rule, to 
perform such duties “as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.”  The Act suggested that the magistrate (1) perform the fact-finding function of 
the special master as set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (2) assume the role 
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to be in widespread use in the federal system by the time the Advisory 
Committee was meeting in the 1930s, there might have been a role for 
them under the Federal Rules.264 
The evidence-gathering purpose of the examination at equity meant 
that all objectionable testimony was recorded.  If such testimony were 
excluded on the basis of an objection, the judge would not be able, at the 
later stage of the litigation, to review the decision to exclude.  Because 
the deposition under the 1938 Federal Rules also had an evidence-
gathering function, the same logic dictated that testimony could not be 
excluded.  The law of evidence plays no role at the pretrial deposition 
because no judge is present. 
Contemporaries recognized the radical nature of discovery 
provisions in the Federal Rules.  Some lawyers anticipated that expanded 
discovery would displace some trials by clarifying fact issues in the 
pretrial process.265  The cost of discovery might also function to promote 
settlement.  In 1932 Sunderland had alluded to the “widespread fear of 
liberalizing discovery” because “hostility to ‘fishing expeditions’ before 
trial is a traditional and powerful taboo.”266  By 1947 the Supreme Court 
was endorsing wide-ranging discovery: 
																																																																																																																												
of pretrial assistant (taking on duties similar to those of the English master) and (3) 
review applications for post-trial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal 
offenses.. 
Congress was careful to state, however, that the Act’s enumerated suggestions do 
not exhaust the possible duties that the magistrate may perform.  The legislative history 
of the Act indicates that Congress did not intend to limit the magistrates’ duties to those 
enumerated: 
Proposed 28 U.S.C. 636(b) mentions three categories of functions 
assignable to magistrates under its provisions. The mention of these three 
categories is intended to illustrate the general character of duties assignable 
to magistrates under the act, rather than to constitute an exclusive 
specification of duties so assignable . . . . 
Commentary on the Magistrates Act, H.R. REP. NO. 1629 (1968) at 19.  See generally, 
Linda J. Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part II: The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. 
L. REV 1297, 1299–1300 (1975) (describing the possible duties that a magistrate may 
perform). 
 264 For a discussion of post-1938 proposals to establish standing masters, paid from 
public funds, to supervise discovery, see Note, Developments in the Law: Discovery, 74 
HARV. L. REV. 940, 1006–07 (1961). 
 265 John Langbein has recently provided an excellent analysis of the vanishing trial in 
the United States.  Langbein argues that expanded discovery (including, inter alia, the 
absence of a judge or judge-like officer from the oral deposition) has rendered trial 
obsolete.  See Disappearance of Civil Trial, supra note 5, at 546, 572. 
 266 Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword, in RAGLAND, supra note 81, at iii.  In a 1980 
survey of 180 civil litigators in Chicago, the most common terms used to describe the 
state of discovery was “overdiscovery” and “harassment.”  Wayne D. Brazil, Civil 
Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 5 
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[T]he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and 
liberal treatment.  No longer can the time-honored cry of “fishing 
expedition” serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts 
underlying the opponent’s case.  Mutual knowledge of all the 
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper 
litigation.267 
Amendments to the discovery rules in 1970 and 1993 further 
expanded the right to discovery. 268   The mandatory disclosure rules 
provided for near-mandatory discovery without requiring a formal 
request for discovery.269  The 1938 Advisory Committee’s decision not 
																																																																																																																												
AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH 787, 830-31 (1980).  According to one Chicago lawyer, 
“discovery is too much of a game to see how much you can hide.”  Id. at 824. 
 267 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).  It is worth noting that in Hickman 
the Supreme Court upheld the attorney work-product doctrine, which protects lawyers’ 
mental impressions and strategies from discovery: 
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the 
advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of 
his clients.  In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a 
lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary 
intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.  Proper preparation of a 
client’s case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers 
to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and 
plan his strategy without undue and needless interference.  That is the 
historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework 
of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients’ 
interests.  This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, 
memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, 
and countless other tangible and intangible ways-aptly though roughly 
termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case as the ‘Work product of 
the lawyer.’  Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere 
demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten.  
An attorney’s thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own.  
Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the 
giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial.  The effect on 
the legal profession would be demoralizing.  And the interests of the clients 
and the cause of justice would be poorly served. 
Id. at 510–11. 
The work-product doctrine has yielded attempts to “play games” to which the 
Rules sought to put an end.  See, e.g., Liesa L. Richter, Corporate Salvation or 
Damnation?  Proposed New Federal Legislation on Selective Waiver, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 129 (2007) (describing attempts by corporations to use selective waiver to cooperate 
with the government and yet protect themselves from shareholder derivative suits and 
class action securities suits). 
 268 Advisory Committee’s Statement Concerning Amendments of the Discovery 
Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487 (1970); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (1993). 
 269 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (1993).  In his initial draft of the discovery rules, Sunderland 
had included a method of forcing an adversary “to furnish adequately descriptive lists of 
documents, books, accounts, letters or other papers, photographs, or tangible things, 
which are known to him and are relevant to the pending cause or any designated part 
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to provide a master to supervise a deposition was a significant, and 
overlooked, element in the shaping of modern American civil procedure, 
including the displacement of civil trial by pretrial discovery. 
 
APPENDIX A: DRAFTS OF FEDERAL RULES PROVIDING FOR DEPOSITIONS 
BEFORE A MASTER 
I. Tentative Draft II270 (December 23, 1935 – January 15, 1936) 
(unpublished) 
Rule 30(c) [Officers Before Whom Depositions May be Taken.  
Letters Rogatory]271 
If the adverse party, upon being served with a notice of taking a 
deposition by oral examination, shall promptly apply to the court 
for an order that such deposition be taken before a standing 
master of the court or a special master appointed for such 
purpose, and shall show in such application special and unusual 
circumstances sufficient to satisfy the court that the deposition 
cannot be satisfactorily taken before an examiner as provided by 
the preceding paragraphs, the court may make such order, and fix 
therein the time and place of examination, and may also by the 
terms thereof authorize such master to receive or exclude 
evidence in all respects as though the evidence were offered 
before the court.  In such case the master’s fees shall be fixed by 
the order and they shall be advanced by the party applying 
therefor. 
Notes: 
The taking of testimony by a master should be the exception 
rather than the rule.  It is very expensive.  Federal equity rules 
regarding the use of masters have been widely criticized on 
account of the expense.  Lane, in 35 Harvard Law Rev. 296-7, 
																																																																																																																												
thereof.”  Subrin, supra note 10, at 718–19 (quoting Rule 57(a), Tentative Draft No. 1 
(Oct. 16, 1935)).  This rule did not become a part of the final 1938 Federal Rules. 
 270 Preparatory Papers: Drafts, Reports and Correspondence used in the Preparation 
of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, in CLARK 
PAPERS, supra note 100, box 98. “Tentative Draft II” was marked “Confidential – Not 
Published.” 
 271 This version of Rule 30(c) was dated January 13, 1936, following Wickersham’s 
proposal for the appointment of a master. 
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suggests that these rules “should be eliminated or radically 
changed.” 
It is questionable whether a master should exercise the power of 
excluding evidence in the taking of depositions.  In performing 
this duty he is not engaged in making findings or giving opinions 
by only in taking testimony. 
‘A referee appointed merely to take evidence should take all that 
is offered and leave it to the court to determine what is not 
competent.  But if the reference is to report the evidence with the 
opinion of the referee as distinguished from a reference merely to 
take testimony, the referee is not bound to take testimony which 
appears to him to be not relevant to the issue.’ – 53 C.J. [Corpus 
Juris] 731. 
Common practice in taking depositions on commission does not 
involve rulings on evidence by the commissioner.  ‘Generally he 
(the commissioner) has no authority to determine the competency 
of the witness, the propriety of the questions, or the admissibility 
of the evidence, but must take down the questions and answers 
and not the objections and exceptions for subsequent 
determination by the court.’ – 18 C.J. 684. 
Modern discovery and deposition procedure makes practically no 
use of officers having power to decide objections. 
In his Notes above, Sunderland also referred to Ragland’s discovery 
Before Trial regarding the Wisconsin and Missouri rules regarding the 
powers of the presiding officer at depositions.  The drafters of the notes 
also cautioned that using a master would be cumbersome with respect to 
appeals of the master’s decisions. The drafters cited Dowagiac Mfg. Co. 
v. Lochren, in which the auxiliary court refused to compel production of 
certain testimony and the appellate court disagreed, but the appellate 
court could not consider the rejected evidence and render a final decree 
without remanding the case for further proof.272 
II. Tentative Draft III (March, 1936) (unpublished)273 
Rule 33(b): 
																																																																																																																												
 272 143 F. 211, 214 (8th Cir. 1906). 
 273 CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, Box 98 [Tentative Draft III]. 
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When notice is served for taking the deposition by oral 
examination of any party, or of an officer, director, agent or 
employee of any party, the court in which the action is pending 
may, on motion promptly made by such party and on good cause 
shown, make an order directing that such deposition shall be 
taken before a standing master of the court or a special master 
appointed for that purpose, and authorizing such master to rule 
on the admission of evidence.  The order shall fix the master’s 
fees and they shall be advanced by the moving party. 
Rule 33(c) – if the deposition is not held before a master, the 
deponent: 
may at any time, on a showing that the examination is being 
conducted in bad faith, or for the purpose of oppressing, 
annoying or embarrassing the deponent or such party, apply to 
the court in which the action is pending, or to the court in the 
district where the deposition is being taken, for an order directing 
the officer conducting such examination to cease forthwith from 
taking the deposition.  If such an order is made, the examination 
shall proceed thereafter only upon the order of the court in which 
the action is pending.” 
The drafters indicated in a Note to Rule 33(b) that it is 
“substantially” identical to the one in he printed preliminary draft 
circulated for comment: “It is introduced as a safeguard on account of the 
unlimited right of discovery given by Rule 32 [“Depositions – Their 
Form, Purpose, Scope and Effect”].274 
III. Preliminary Draft (May, 1936) 
The Advisory Committee had this version published in order to 
solicit “suggestions by the Bench and Bar.”275 
 
Rule 32(b): 
(b) Deposition Before a Master.  When notice is served for taking 
the deposition by oral examination of any party, or of an officer, 
director, agent or employee of any party, the court in which the 
action is pending may, on motion promptly made by such party 
and on good cause shown, make an order directing that such 
deposition shall be taken before a standing master of the court or 
																																																																																																																												
 274 Id. 
 275 PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA iii (1936). 
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a special master appointed for that purpose, and authorizing such 
master to rule on the admission of evidence.  The order shall fix 
the master’s fees and they shall be advanced by the moving 
party.276 
Note to Rule 32(b): 
(b) The provision for reference to a master is for the purpose of 
protecting parties from oppression in cases where there is reason 
to believe that the examination is likely to include matters not 
properly subject to discovery.  It is introduced as a safeguard on 
account of the unlimited right of discovery given by Rule 31.  
Missouri has a somewhat similar provision, by which the party 
served with notice for taking depositions, may, in cities of more 
than 50,000 population, apply for the appointment of a special 
commissioner with the power to rule upon the admission of 
evidence.  Mo., Rev. Stat. (1929), § 1759.277 
Rule 32(c): 
(c) Examinations not Conduction in Good Faith May be 
Enjoined.  When the deposition of a party, or of any officer, 
director, agent, or employee of any party, is being taken upon 
oral examination, before any officer other than a master, the 
deponent or party may at any time, on a showing that the 
examination is being conducted in bad faith, or for the purpose of 
oppressing, annoying or embarrassing the deponent or such party, 
apply to the court in which the action is pending, or to the court 
in the district where the deposition is being taken, for an order 
directing the officer conducting such examination to cease 
forthwith from taking the deposition.  If such an order is made, 
the examination shall proceed thereafter only upon the order of 
the court in which the action is pending.278 
IV. Preliminary Draft II (October 22, 1936) (unpublished)279 
Rule 32(b), which replaced Rule 33(b) from Tentative Draft III: 
Substitute presented by Professor Sunderland at Meeting of 
10/22/36. (b) Orders for Protection of Deponents.  When notice 
is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, the court in 
																																																																																																																												
 276 Id. at 60–61. 
 277 Id. at 61. 
 278 Id. 
 279 CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 99 [Preliminary Draft II].  This source is 
labeled: “mimeographed after meeting of October 22, 1936.” 
2013] The Origins of the Oral Deposition in the Federal Rules 97 
	
which the action is pending may, on application of any party or 
any person to be examined, promptly made and on good cause 
shown, make an order directing that the deposition shall be taken 
before a standing or special master of the court, or before some 
designated person, or that certain matters shall not be inquired 
into, or that the examination shall be held with no one present 
except the parties to the record or their officers or counsel and 
that after being sealed the deposition shall be opened only by 
order of the court, or make any other order which justice may 
require to protect the party or witness from annoyance, 
embarrassment or oppression.  If an order is made that the 
deposition be taken before a master, the order shall fix the fees 
and they shall be advanced by the party or witness applying for 
the order. 
The text of Rule 51(c), “Subpoena,” indicated that as of October 
1936 the drafters still contemplated the possibility that a master might 
preside over a deposition: 
(c) – “Subpoena for Taking Depositions; Place of Examination.  
A copy of the notice to take a deposition, as provided in Rule 34, 
and proof of service thereof, shall constitute a sufficient 
authorization for the issuance of subpoenas for the persons 
named therein by the clerk of the district court for the district in 
which the deposition is to be taken.  He shall not, however, issue 
a subpoena commanding the production of books, papers, or 
document directed to any such person without an order of the 
court, unless the deposition is taken before a master with 
authority to rule upon the admission of evidence.280 
Charles Clark reported in the minutes to the Advisory Committee’s 
meeting of October 25, 1936: “It was agreed that Rule 32(b) 
[“Depositions Before Masters”] be stricken out, subject to the agreement 
to transfer certain parts of it to (c).”281 
																																																																																																																												
 280 Id. (emphasis added). 
 281 Proceedings of the Advisory Committee (Oct. 22, 1936) at 2, in CLARK PAPERS, 
supra note 100, box 96. 
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V. Preliminary Draft III (December, 1936 – January 1937) 
(unpublished)282 
In this draft someone has drawn a red line through the text “32(b) 
Depositions Before a Master” and indicated that the text of the rule had 
been moved to Rule 34 (Oral Examination). 
VI. Preliminary Draft (February 1937) (unpublished)283 
In this version the drafters eliminated the provision for reference to 
a master.  They instead included Rule 34(f): 
(f) Orders for the Protection of Parties and Deponents:  
(1) After notice is served for taking a deposition by 
oral examination, the court in which the action is 
pending, on motion of any party or of any person to 
be examined, seasonably made and upon notice and 
good cause shown, may make an order that such 
deposition shall not be taken, or that certain matters 
shall not be inquired into =, or that the scope of the 
examination shall be limited to certain matters, or that 
the examination shall be held with no one present 
except the parties to the record or their officers or 
counsel and that after being sealed the deposition 
shall be opened only by order of the court, or that 
secret processes, developments, or research need not 
be disclosed or that the parties shall simultaneously 
file specified documents or information enclosed in 
sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the 
court, or may make any other order which justice may 
require to protect the party or witness from 
annoyance, embarrassment or oppression. 
(2) At any time, during the taking of the deposition, 
on motion of any party or the deponent, and upon a 
showing that the examination is being conducted in 
bad faith, or for the purpose of oppressing, annoying 
or embarrassing the deponent or party, the court in 
which the action is pending, or the court in the district 
where the deposition is being taken, may make an 
order directing the officer conducting such 
																																																																																																																												
 282 CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 100 [Preliminary Draft III].  This bound 
volume also contains “Notes and Reporter’s Comments.” 
 283 Id. 
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examination to cease forthwith from taking the 
deposition.  If such order is made, the examination 
shall proceed only upon the order of the court in 
which the action is pending. 
VII. Proposed Rules (April 30, 1937) (published) 
When the Advisory Committee published its April 30, 1937 report 
to the Supreme Court, the drafters transferred the text of Rule 34(f)(1) to 
Rule 30(b), “Orders for the Protection of Parties and Deponents.”284  The 
Committee also transferred the text of Rule 34(f)(2) to Rule 30(d), 
“Motion to Terminate Examination.” 285   The Advisory Committee 
included the following Note: 
Note to subdivisions (b) and (d).  These are introduced as a 
safeguard for the protection of parties and deponents on account 
of the unlimited right of discovery granted by Rule 26.286 
The April 1937 version of Rule 28, “Persons Before Whom Depositions 
May be Taken,” no longer included the option of requesting that a master 
preside.287 
VIII. Final Draft of the 1938 Rules288 
Rule 30(b): 
(b) Orders for the Protection of Parties and Deponents.  After 
notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon 
motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be 
examined and upon notice and for good cause shown, the court in 
which the action is pending may make an order that the 
deposition shall not be taken, or that it may be taken only at some 
designated place other than that stated in the notice, or that it may 
be taken only on written interrogatories, or that certain matters 
shall not be inquired into, or that the scope of the examination 
shall be limited to certain matters, or that the examination shall 
																																																																																																																												
 284 Rule 30, CLARK PAPERS, supra note 100, box 100 [Report of the Advisory 
Committee to the Supreme Court of the United States, April 30, 1937]; REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE APPOINTED BY THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES CONTAINING PROPOSED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR 
THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 76–81 (1937).  Rule 30(b), supra. at 76–77. 
 285 Id. at 78 
 286 Id. at 81 
 287 See Rule 28, id. at 75–76. 
 288 H.R. DOC. NO. 460 (1938).  This pamphlet was published in 1938 without the 
Advisory Committee’s Notes. 
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be held with no one present except the parties to the record or 
their officers or counsel, or that after being sealed the deposition 
shall be opened only by order of the court, or that secret 
processes, developments, or research need not be disclosed, or 
that the parties shall simultaneously file specified documents or 
information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as 
directed by the court; or the court may make any other order 
which justice requires to protect the party or witness from 
annoyance, embarrassment or oppression.289 
Rule 30(d): 
(d) Motion to Terminate or Limit Examination.  At any time 
during the taking of the deposition, on motion of any party or the 
deponent and upon a showing that the examination is being 
conducted in bad faith, or in such manner as unreasonably to 
annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party, the court in 
which the action is pending or the court in the district where the 
deposition is being taken may order the officer conducting the 
examination to cease forthwith from taking the deposition, or 
may limit the scope and manner of the taking of the deposition as 
provided in subdivision (b).  If the order made terminates the 
examination, it shall be resumed thereafter only upon the order of 
the court in which the action is pending.  Upon demand of the 
objecting party or deponent, the taking of the deposition shall be 
suspended for the time necessary to make a motion for an order.  
In granting or refusing such order the court may impose upon 
either party or upon the witness the requirement to pay such costs 
or expenses as the court may deem reasonable.290 
APPENDIX B: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF PARTY-DIRECTED ORAL 
EXAMINATION: ONTARIO 
Background 
In 1837, the legislature of Upper Canada (Ontario) established a 
Court of Chancery.291  The Act stated that the court’s powers would 
include the authority to “ . . . compel the discovery of concealed papers 
or evidence, or such as may be wrongfully withheld from the party 
claiming the benefit of the same . . . .”292  The procedure provided for 
																																																																																																																												
 289 Id. at 39. 
 290 Id. at 40. 
 291 An Act to Establish a Court of Chancery in this Province, 7 Wm. IV c. 2 (U.C.). 
 292 Court of Chancery Act, s. 2. 
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oral witness testimony and examination by counsel in the presence of the 
Vice Chancellor or of a Master.293  These provisions predated the 1852 
English reform of Chancery, which provided that parties could present 
evidence orally or by affidavit.294  The statute provided that an Examiner 
would conduct oral examinations, rather than the judge at the hearing 
itself.295  Peter Fraser has speculated that the Ontario Act establishing the 
Court of Chancery “was perhaps inspired by a Nova Scotia statute of 
1833, permitting its Court of Chancery to have examination of witnesses 
viva vice before the Court.”296 
The new oral method of discovery was short-lived initially.297  In 
practice, oral examinations for discovery in Upper Canada occurred 
before a Special Master or Special Examiner rather than before the Vice-
Chancellor. 298   W.D. Gwynne, writing in the 1890s, criticized 
contemporary examiners: “Folio after folio of evidence is inserted in 
almost every brief, whose only end is to lengthen the examiner’s bill.”299  
Gwynne also narrated the developments in the procedure for oral 
examination for discovery beginning with the establishment of the Court 
of Chancery in Ontario in 1837. 300   Due to deficiencies among the 
																																																																																																																												
 293 Id., s. 5. 
 294 An Act to Amend the Practice and Course of Proceeding in the High Court of 
Chancery, 15 & 16 Vict. C. 86 (1852). 
 295 Id., s. 31. 
 296 PETER FRASER, DISCOVERY OF FACT IN ONTARIO AND BRITISH COLUMBIA (LL.M. 
Thesis, University of Toronto 1970) 27.  See An Act for Amending the Practice of the 
Court of Chancery and Diminishing the Expenses Thereof, 3 Wm. IV c. 52, s. 12 (N.S.) 
cited in SIR CHARLES TOWNSHEND, THE HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY IN NOVA 
SCOTIA (1900) 89-91.  Townsend remarked: “The process of the process of the Court is 
simplified in respect to execution of decrees, and a settled mode of procedure ratified by 
statute, and I should think a very great improvement was made in allowing witnesses to 
be examined viva voce in Court.  Hitherto the practice was to have them examined by 
means of interrogatories before examiners, which can never be as satisfactory as in open 
Court.”  CHANCERY IN NOVA SCOTIA at 91. 
 297 The oral examination would return in 1850. 
 298 See W.D. Gwynne, The Special Examiners, 15 CAN. L. TIMES 221, 223 (1895) 
(“ . . . it appears to have been customary to obtain an order for the examination of country 
witnesses before a master extraordinary, instead of going to the expense of bringing them 
up to town.”). 
 299 W.D. Gwynne, The Special Examiners, 15 CAN. L. TIMES 221, 221 (1895). 
 300 Id. at 223-226.  Gwynne leveled four criticisms at the contemporary discovery 
procedure: 
The system is abused in four ways: 
(1) By examining counsel exceeding the limits of proper 
discovery. 
(2) By cross-examining counsel going into unnecessary matters 
and at undue length. 
(3) By want of careful preparation by counsel. 
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Masters, the Court of Chancery replaced its innovative procedure for oral 
examination with the traditional system of examining witnesses using 
written interrogatories.301  Under the latter procedure, the parties’ counsel 
exchanged interrogatories and cross-interrogatories prior to the 
examination; each party was entitled to fourteen days’ notice from the 
opposing party before the examination.302 
The Upper Canada Chancery Commission 
The next step in the reform of discovery procedure occurred as a 
result of the union between Upper and Lower Canada in 1841.  After the 
union, the Legislative Council of Canada “directed the removal of the 
Court of Chancery” to Kingston although the Court of King’s Bench 
continued to be located in Toronto.303  On January 1, 1842 the Vice-
Chancellor ordered that all solicitors who practice before the Court of 
Chancery must specify “an agent residing in the Town or Township of 
Kingston . . . ” for service of documents.304  Many in the Ontario legal 
community were unhappy with the relocation of the court.  In response, 
in November 1842 a group of prominent lawyers, led by then-Treasurer 
of the Law Society of Upper Canada and former judge Levius Peters 
Sherwood and Attorney-General W.H. Draper, agreed to lobby the 
Governor-General, urging that the Court of Chancery remain 
permanently situated in Toronto. 305   Moreover, the Ontario bar 
association objected to the fact that Vice-Chancellor, Robert Sympson 
Jameson, had been appointed Speaker of the first Legislative Council of 
Canada; the bar objected to “the union of legislative and judicial duties in 
the same person.”306 
																																																																																																																												
(4) By giving uncontrolled liberty to the witness. 
Id. at 227. 
 301 See Chancery Order LXXIV (Upper Canada), Dec. 23rd, 1839 (noting that the 
contemporary method of examining witnesses may lead to the introduction of improper 
testimony and re-introducing the written interrogatory as a means of eliciting evidence).  
The Order also required that all objections, “either to the interrogatories or depositions, 
shall be taken, not at the time of the examination, but after publication.” 
 302 Id.  In 1840 the notice was increased to twenty-eight days.  See Chancery Order 
LXXVI (Upper Canada), Aug. 25th, 1840. 
 303 WILLIAM RENWICK RIDDELL, THE BAR AND THE COURTS OF THE PROVINCE OF 
UPPER CANADA, OR ONTARIO 188 (1928). 
 304 Id. at 189. 
 305 Id.  The group emphasized that the law library, courtrooms and offices already 
existed in Toronto. 
 306 Id.  For this proposition Riddell cites Minute Book, Law Society of Upper Canada, 
No. 2, 363 et seq. 
2013] The Origins of the Oral Deposition in the Federal Rules 103 
	
In response to the Ontario bar’s complaints, the Parliament of 
Upper and Lower Canada appointed a Commission of Enquiry to 
examine the rules and procedures of the Court of Chancery.307   The 
Commission was appointed on July 20, 1844 and included both the Chief 
Justice and the Senior Puisne Judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench, as 
well as prominent Chancery Counsel: Henry John Boulton, Robert 
Easton Burns, William Hume Blake, James C. Palmer Esten.308  The 
Commission reported in April, 1845 and in January, 1846.309  In 1849, 
the Legislature passed An Act for the More Effectual Administration of 
Justice in the Court of Chancery of the Late Province of Upper-Canada, 
which incorporated the Commission’s reports.310 
In their 1845 report, the Commissioners had issued the following 
“quite daring” 311  recommendation, proposing a system of oral 
examination before trial three years before the Field Code: 
That the Plaintiff and Defendant shall be respectively permitted 
to examine each other, viva voce, by Counsel,—the one upon the 
matters stated in his bill, and the other upon the answer; such 
examinations to be conducted at nisi prius before the Judge 
presiding . . . 
It will be requisite to provide for restraining the examination 
within proper bounds as to relevancy, leading questions, &c. for 
the method of taking down, settling and authenticating the 
answers . . . . 
If we can, by proper regulations, prevent the proposed mode of 
examination by Counsel viva voce in an open Court from 
occasioning delay, we think great advantage will be gained by 
such a manner of eliciting the truth.312 
																																																																																																																												
 307 See Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada, No. 3, 1843, 
at 67. 
 308 See 12 Vic. c. 64, s. 11 (May 30th, 1849); 3 PROVINCIAL STATUTES OF CANADA 
(1849) 399-400; Riddell, 195n20. 
 309 12 Vic. c. 64, s. 11 
 310 Id.; 3 PROVINCIAL STATUTES OF CANADA (1849) 397-402.  See Riddell at 195n20 
(“Much of the [b]ill passed in 1849 was the outcome of their reports”). 
 311 FRASER, DISCOVERY OF FACT, at 31. 
 312 Commissioner’s report (cited in Fraser at 31; ORIGINAL REPORT in Manuscript 
and Archives, SML, and to be consulted – the report is unpaginated and consists of an 
appendix to the Journal of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada).  The 
reference to truth-generation is striking because most twentieth-century Anglo-American 
commentators expressed great concern over the potential for perjury in pretrial oral 
examinations, so much so that many opposed a liberal pretrial discovery regime on the 
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According to Stephen Subrin, New York’s Field Code of 1848 was 
“the biggest systemic procedural change in the United States, after the 
adoption of common law systems.”313  The Code provided for pre-trial 
depositions of adverse parties, but such an examination was a substitute 
for testimony at trial.314  Moreover, the deposition under the Field Code 
took place “before a judge of the court or a county judge” who would 
rule on objections.315  The Field Code presumed that the pleadings would 
properly frame the issues in the case and did not include any 
interrogatory provisions. 316   Although the Field Code itself did not 
restrict the scope of the pretrial examination, “New York lawyers even 
after the adoption of the code were restricted by the traditional idea that 
in Chancery the right of a party to a discovery did not extend to all facts 
material to the issue, but was limited to such material facts as were 
necessary to establish his cause of action or defense.”317 
The Commissioners noted that, with respect to the defendant, the 
innovation “goes no further than the substituting one mode of 
examination for another.”  With respect to the plaintiff, however: 
the change is far greater, for it is [sic] not hitherto been allowed 
in Equity to examine the Plaintiff at all. In regard to the matters 
charged in his bill; nor has the plaintiff . . . . 
Conscious of the ambitious nature of their recommendation, the 
Commissioners continued: 
																																																																																																																												
grounds that it would suborn false testimony.  See GORDON D. CUDMORE, CHOATE ON 
DISCOVERY, 2d ed. at 1-1 to 1-2 (1993). 
 313 Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of 
the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 696 (1998).  For background on 
David Dudley Field himself, see Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field 
Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 311, 313-
27 (1988).  For a detailed narrative of the enactment of the Field Code, see Mildred V. 
Coe and Lewis W. Morse, Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley Field 
Code, 27 CORNELL L. Q. 238 (1942).  Field’s own reflections on the legacy of his reforms 
can be found in David Dudley Field, Law Reform in the United States and its Influence 
Abroad, 25 AM. L. REV. 515 (1891). 
 314 (1848) N.Y. Laws, c. 379 (71st Sess., April 12, 1848) [hereinafter “1848 Field 
Code”] § 345.  The examination would be taken “subject to the same rules of 
examination, as any other witness.”  Id. § 344. 
 315 Id. 
 316 Subrin, Field and the Field Code, supra note 313, at 332. 
 317 Martin Conboy, Depositions, Discovery and Summary Judgments: As Dealt with in 
Title V of the Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal Courts, 22 A.B.A. J. 
881, 882 (1936).  By the end of the nineteenth century the Field Code had been adopted 
by about half the states.  Subrin, supra note 79, at 939. 
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We do not recommend this change without hesitation.  Its merely 
being a departure from the English system, in a very essential 
point, has lead us to apprehend, that objections and 
inconveniences which cannot readily be foreseen, may discover 
themselves in practice . . . . 
We are at present, however, of opinion, that an experiment 
should be made of this system, as it affords a promise of doing 
something effectual, towards bringing the expences [sic] of a suit 
in Chancery, within reasonable bounds, by the only means by 
which it can be accomplished,—that is, by shortening and 
simplifying the proceedings.318 
The Ontario Chancery Rules 
The 1849 legislation that empowered the judges of the Court of 
Chancery to make its own rules specifically authorized them to 
promulgate rules that implemented the oral examination: 
[A]nd whereas it is desirable that the suggestions of the said 
Commissioners, in regard to shortening the bill and answer, and 
enabling the Plaintiff to obtain discovery through the medium of 
a viva voce examination of the Defendant, and for extending a 
like privilege to the Defendant in relation to the viva voce 
examination of the Plaintiff, should be adopted; and whereas it is 
believed that the adoption of the above suggestion, the abolition 
of all unnecessary proceedings, and enabling matters to advance 
uninterruptedly in the Master’s Office, will greatly tend to 
diminish the costs of proceedings in the said Court, and to 
promote the ends of Justice, but it is nevertheless expedient for 
the purpose of more conveniently and safely carrying out these 
and other alterations, that power should be vested in the Judges to 
be appointed under this Act, to make such rules and orders 
respecting the pleadings and practice of the said Court, for the 
																																																																																																																												
 318 Id.  The recommendation also included reducing the Plaintiff’s bill to: 
a mere statement of his case, setting forth concisely the facts necessary to shew his claim 
to the relief prayed, and ending with a suitable prayer for relief,—not inserting any 
matters which are mere evidence of facts nor any interrogatories for the purpose of 
obtaining a discovery from the Defendant’s answer; that the Defendant may, in his turn, 
demur or plead the bill as heretofore, but if he answers, he must confine his answer to the 
mere setting forth of his defence, inserting nothing more than is strictly necessary to a 
precise and intelligible statement of the matter on which he relies; and that anything 
beyond these statements in the bill or answer, shall be deemed impertinent, and be 
expunged or disallowed on taxation. 
Chancery Commissioners’ Report. 
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purpose of carrying out the aforesaid suggestion, as well as such 
others as to them may seem expedient for the purposes 
mentioned in the hereinbefore recited Commission, and for 
amending or modifying any of the rules or orders, which have 
been or may be made for that purpose, and for regulating the 
Offices of Master and Registrar of the said Court of Chancery, as 
well as for rescinding the said rules and orders, or any of 
them . . . 319 
The legislature thus emphasized both the reduction in litigants’ 
costs as well as the promotion of justice. 
The enacting clause of the 1849 legislation stated: 
Be it therefore enacted, That [sic] it shall be lawful for the Judges 
to be appointed under this Act for the time being, to make such 
rules and orders as to them may seem expedient, for regulating 
the Offices of Master and Registrar of the said Court of 
Chancery, and for the carrying into effect the recommendations 
of the said Commissioners as aforesaid, and from time to time to 
make other rules and orders, amending, altering or rescinding the 
same, or any of them, and also to make all such rules and orders 
as to them may seem meet, for the purpose of adapting the 
proceedings of the said Court of Chancery to the circumstances 
of this Province, as well in regard to the Process and Pleadings, 
as in the practice and proceedings of the said Court, and more 
especially the taking, publishing, using and hearing of testimony 
in any suit therein pending, or the examination of all, or any of 
the parties to any such suit upon their oaths, viva voce or 
otherwise, including also the power to regulate by rules or orders, 
the allowance and amount of costs . . . 320 
In 1850 the judges of the Court of Chancery promulgated Orders 
that established the rules regarding oral examination before trial. Order L 
stated: 
Any party to a suit may be examined as a witness by the party 
adverse in point of interest, or by any one of several parties 
adverse in point of interest, without any special order for that 
purpose: and may be compelled to attend and testify in the same 
manner upon the same terms, and subject to the same rules of 
examination as any other witness, except as hereinafter provided.  
																																																																																																																												
 319 12 Vic. c. 64, s. 11. 
 320 Id.  The Act included a proviso that “no such rule or order shall have the effect of 
altering the principles or rules of decision of the said Court . . . ,” i.e. the procedural 
changes could not affect or undermine the substantive law. 
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And any person, for whose immediate benefit a suit is prosecuted 
or defended, though not a party to the record, may be regarded as 
a party for the purpose of this order.321 
Order LVII authorized cross-examination.  “Evidence taken under Order 
L. may be rebutted by adverse testimony.”322  Any party that had been 
examined under Order L could testify on his own behalf “in relation to 
any matter respecting which he has been examined in chief.”323 
Furthermore, Order LIII abolished interrogatories, replacing them 
with the party-conducted or lawyer-conducted deposition.  Notably, the 
Order applied to both witnesses and parties: 
No written interrogatories for the examination of either witnesses 
or parties, either before or after decree, shall henceforth be filed, 
except by direction of the Court; such examinations shall be viva 
voce, and may be conducted either by the parties, their solicitors 
or counsel.324 
Under Order LVIII, “any party refusing or neglecting to attend at 
the time and place appointed for his examination under Order L. may be 
punished as for contempt . . . .”325 
The new rules provided more flexibility than the previous practice.  
For example, “previous to the new rules . . . it was only under the most 
special circumstances, and indeed very rarely, that a witness could be 
recalled.”326  Order LX, in contrast, provided that a witness might be 
recalled to be examined before the Court after publication if the Master 
Extraordinary erred in his examination of the examinant.327 
																																																																																																																												
 321 ROBERT COOPER, THE RULES AND PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF UPPER 
CANADA, COMPRISING THE ORDERS OF 1850 AND 1851, WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES 
REFERRING TO THE ENGLISH ORDERS AND DECISIONS 61 (1851).  Order L preserved the 
common law adversarial structure within the discovery process: 
Provided always that, where it shall appear upon the hearing that any party examined 
under this Order is united in interest with the examining party, the evidence so taken shall 
not be used on behalf of either the examining party, or of the examinant, but may be 
struck out on the hearing at the instance of any party affected thereby. 
 322 Id. at 62. 
 323 Id. 
 324 Chancery Order LIII, RULES AND PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF UPPER 
CANADA at 54. 
 325 Chancery Order LVIII, Id. 
 326 Id. at 63. 
 327 See Chancery Order LX.  Gwynne was more impolitic: “to guard against the 
dangers of  arising from the incompetence of the country examiners, it was provided that 
a witness might be recalled after publication on special order.”  Gwynne, supra note 299 
at 224. 
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Further Ontario Developments 
In 1856, Ontario adopted the English Common Law Procedure Act 
(1854), allowing for written interrogatories in the common law courts.  
Oral examination for discovery continued to be available in Ontario’s 
Court of Chancery.  (There was therefore one court (Chancery) in which 
the only mode of discovery was by oral examination and one court 
(Common Law) in which the only mode of discovery was by written 
interrogatories.)  The Administration of Justice Act of 1873 extended the 
availability of oral discovery to the common law courts, and amendments 
in 1877 permitted litigants to examine “any party adverse in point of 
interest . . . touching the matters in question in the action.”328  Common 
law litigants were required to seek an order to obtain oral discovery, but 
such orders were “issued as of course.”329 
When the Administration of Justice Act of 1873 introduced oral 
examination for discovery to the common law courts of Ontario.330  Eight 
comments regarding the Justice Act appeared in the Canada Law Journal; 
two pertained to the discovery provisions.  Ontario’s experience with 
oral examination for discovery most likely explains the dearth of 
reaction.331 
Ontario’s Judicature Act was passed in 1881.  By 1887 a set of 
consolidated rules combining equity and common law procedures was 
introduced, which expressly provided for the oral examination of an 
adverse party without a court order.332
 
Rule 487 under the Consolidated Rules (1887) provided: 
Any party to an action or issue whether plaintiff or defendant, or 
in the case of a body corporate, anyone who is or has been one of 
the officers of such body corporate, may without any special 
Order for the purpose be orally examined before the trial 
touching the matters in question in the action by any party 
adverse in point of interest; and may be compelled to attend and 
																																																																																																																												
 328 CUDMORE, supra note 312, at 1-4 to 1-5; Leitch v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 13 Ont. 
P.R. 369, 379-380 (1890).  Also in 1877, revisions to the Common Law Procedure Act 
permitted parties to hold the examination before a Special Examiner or local Master in 
Chancery without an order, instead of holding the examination before a judge. 
 329 Menzies v. McLeod, 34 O.L.R. 572, 573 (1915). 
 330 Stat. Ont., 36 Vict. c. 8. 
 331 See Note, Administration of Justice Act, 9 CAN. L. JOURNAL 109, 111 (1873) (“The 
clauses for the examination of parties, &c. we do not stay to examine in detail, but 
recognize their great value, and similar powers have worked well in Chancery 
Procedure.”). 
 332 A party could be examined on any matter “touching the matters in question in the 
action.”  See Fraser at 41. 
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testify in the same manner, upon the same terms, and subject to 
the same rules of examination as any witness except as 
hereinafter provided.333 
From 1887 to the 1980s there were no significant changes to the 
rules regarding examination for discovery. 
 
																																																																																																																												
 333 Rule 496 authorized cross-examination. 
